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INTRODUCTION 
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government   . . . .”1 These words expound 
the fundamental federal constitutional safeguard of representa-
tive democracy in American states. Conventional wisdom por-
trays this safeguard for a “Republican Form of Government” as 
irrelevant to contemporary constitutional law and politics be-
cause the Supreme Court—and Congress, for that matter—will 
not enforce the Guarantee Clause.2 Yet the real problem with the 
Guarantee Clause is not that the United States enforces it too lit-
tle, but that it enforces it too much. The Clause’s political theo-
retical contents have spilled into other enforceable constitutional 
guarantees. There is no shortage of theories proffered to perfect 
various conceptions of republicanism with the continuing expec-
tation of federal, usually judicial, enforcement.3 The Supreme 
Court, and to a lesser extent the national political branches, have 
taken the law of democracy beyond the basic rights of political 
equality expressed elsewhere in the Constitution into the deeply 
contested realm of republican theory: accountability and partici-
pation, majority rule and minority representation, deliberation 
and responsiveness, equality and liberty of influence, legitimacy 
and self-expression, and competition and stability. The interac-
tion of these competing perfectionist conceptions of republican-
ism has led to the incoherence of the constitutional law of poli-
tics in the States. Federal efforts have produced a system in 
which the States, the Union, and the Republican Form of Gov-
ernment would be better served by letting states do more, and 
the United States less, to fulfill the guarantee. 
There is an alternative pluralist conception of the republican 
guarantee. The Supreme Court once conceded, even while it 
opened the door to the one-person one-vote principle, “the lack 
                                                                                                        
 1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 2. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases under the Guarantee Clause Should be Justici-
able, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 849, 876 (1994). 
 3. See generally id. 
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of criteria by which a court could determine which form of 
government was republican.”4 Despite this concession, howev-
er, questions about the Republican Form of Government per-
vade federal supervision of state election law by the Court and 
its coordinate branches. The Court’s subsequent interpretation 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and of our federal-
ism, masked underlying debates about distinct conceptions of 
republicanism. Meanwhile the People, through the Constitu-
tion itself, refined the republican guarantee by extending the 
right to vote to all races,5 women,6 the poor,7 young adults,8 
and the People directly in electing their Senators.9 Congress 
further extended the guarantee through legislation enforcing 
these amendments, thereby enabling the President to imple-
ment the guarantee in the States.10 The Guarantee Clause itself, 
and with it any distinction between the States and the Union in 
the constitutional regulation of politics, faded from view. 
The submergence of the broad republican guarantee by these 
narrower constitutional commitments helped the federal gov-
ernment improve the forms of government in the States. For a 
time, a federal consensus on basic political equality took the 
United States several steps toward a more perfect union. The 
emergence of primaries eventually engaged more voters in the 
process of party nominations. State and federal campaign fi-
nance regulation brought transparency and some measure of 
equality to campaigns. In the first few decades after passage of 
the Voting Rights Act, the Constitution empowered, the Con-
gress enacted, the Executive enforced, and the Court upheld a 
                                                                                                        
 4. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 (1962); see also Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 
(U.S. Apr. 4, 2016), slip op. at 7 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“So far 
as the Constitution is concerned, there is no single ‘correct’ way to design a repub-
lican government.”). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 (“The District 
constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such 
manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice 
President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress 
to which the District would be entitled if it were a State . . . .”). 
 10. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
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powerful right of access to the franchise. 11  This consensus, 
however, has long since ended. As the United States nears the 
substantial fulfillment of basic political equality in the Second 
Reconstruction, the current political stalemate among the fed-
eral legislative, executive, and judicial branches produces a 
one-size-fits-all republican system that is as dysfunctional as it 
is dominant. 
After the Court in Bush v. Gore brought to light the “common, 
if heretofore unnoticed, phenomenon” of serious problems in 
local administration of federal elections,12 the President still con-
ceded more than a decade later, “[W]e have to fix that.”13 In Citi-
zens United, the Court prematurely heralded “[a] campaign fi-
nance system that pairs corporate independent expenditures 
with effective disclosure” after invalidating restrictions on cor-
porate campaign expenditures.14 But a gridlocked Federal Elec-
tion Commission and Congress have repeatedly failed to take 
executive or legislative action necessary to implement such a 
system. The Court suggested in Shelby County v. Holder, after in-
validating the Voting Rights Act’s central enforcement mecha-
nism, that “Congress may draft another formula based on cur-
rent conditions” to address discriminatory voting practices,15 a 
suggestion unlikely to be taken up in the foreseeable future. The 
one recent case in which the Court acknowledged dysfunction in 
federal election regulation, the inaction of the understaffed Elec-
tion Assistance Commission in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council,16 
laid bare fundamental yet vague divisions among the Justices 
about the scope of the federal government’s power to structure 
elections in the states.17 Even the Guarantee Clause itself resur-
                                                                                                        
 11. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 12. 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000). 
 13. See Brad Plumer, ‘We have to fix that,’ but will we?, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/we-have-to-fix-that-but-
will-we/2012/11/08/c83b4976-29ca-11e2-bab2-eda299503684_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/7WCN-X5RB]. 
 14. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010). 
 15. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 16. See 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013); see also id. at 2273 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The 
EAC currently has no members, and there is no reason to believe that it will be 
restored to life in the near future.”). 
 17. See id. at 2253 (“The [Elections] Clause’s substantive scope is broad.”); id. at 
2261 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“[I]n all events the State’s undoubted inter-
est in the regulation and conduct of elections must be taken into account and 
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faced in a challenge to a Colorado tax limit initiative.18  The 
Court’s decision in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission undermined the plaintiffs’ standing in 
the Colorado case, but not before dropping a provocative foot-
note that “[p]erhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause 
present nonjusticiable political questions.”19 
This Article argues that states do and should play as im-
portant a role as the federal government in articulating and 
implementing the law governing state political processes, or in 
formal terms, their republican forms of government.20 The ar-
gument has four parts. Part I introduces the basic meaning of 
the guarantee and its amendment. Beyond a consensus that 
holds our republicanism to require basic political equality, var-
ious perfectionist conceptions of a republican form of govern-
ment diverge, giving way to the essential pluralism of republi-
can governments in a federal system. Part II explains how the 
Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive are now unable to 
articulate, let alone implement, a workable national consensus 
on any perfectionist republicanism beyond a thin conception of 
those basic rights to political equality. Part III describes the 
                                                                                                        
ought not to be deemed by this Court to be a subject of secondary importance.”); 
id. at 2268 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is, thus, difficult to maintain that the Times, 
Places and Manner Clause gives Congress power beyond regulating the casting of 
ballots and related activities . . . .”); id. at 2271 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court 
has it exactly backwards when it declines to apply the presumption against pre-
emption because ‘the federalism concerns underlying the presumption in the Su-
premacy Clause context are somewhat weaker’ in an Elections Clause case like 
this one.”). 
 18. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1181 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding Guaran-
tee Clause claims arising from state tax limit initiative are justiciable notwith-
standing the political question doctrine), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2927 
(2015). 
 19. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 n.3 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
185 (1992)). 
 20. The title of this Article plays on Herbert Wechsler’s famous The Political Safe-
guards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the Na-
tional Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Wechsler’s thesis was “that the 
existence of the states as governmental entities and as the sources of the standing 
law is in itself the prime determinant of our working federalism,” so that the na-
tional political process protects federalism in the states. Id. at 546. This Article 
inverts Wechsler’s claim, arguing that the existence of the States as the (primary) 
sources of the standing law (of the political process) is itself the prime determi-
nant of our working (or non-working) political process, so that state political pro-
cesses protect the national political process. 
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states as the source of persistent pluralism in their republican 
forms of government, as both legal systems and political cul-
tures that produce and are sustained by those systems. Part IV 
argues that these distinctions in how states articulate and im-
plement their own plural versions of republicanism are crucial 
to efforts toward reforming, let alone perfecting, republicanism 
at the national level. Given the unsettled visions of republican-
ism at the national level and the structural autonomy the states 
must retain at the core of our federal system, a plurality of 
views on republicanism among the states is not only durable 
but desirable. 
I. REPUBLICANISM, PLURALISM, AND PERFECTIONISM 
In defending the Constitution as “strictly republican,” James 
Madison argued that it established a composition of both a “fed-
eral form [of government], which regards the Union as a Confed-
eracy of sovereign states[,]” and “a national government, which 
regards the Union as a consolidation of the States.”21 We might 
recognize the same distinction in the Constitution’s guarantee of 
republicanism in the States. The Guarantee Clause itself, along-
side other direct constitutional guarantees of basic political 
equality such as the extension of voting rights, contains both 
federal and national modes of implementing republicanism. 
The federal mode establishes the necessary terms for partici-
pating in the confederation, such as the Guarantee Clause’s 
prohibition of state aristocracies that corrupt neighboring 
states, or the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on race-based 
discrimination in voting that undermines the reconstructed Un-
ion. 22  These provisions also contain important nationalizing 
elements in terms of setting a floor of basic political equality 
among individual citizens (no monarchs) and between classes 
of citizens (no abridgement of the vote because of race) within 
the States. Such rules unify the nation under a certain broad 
conception of republicanism even as they preserve the confed-
eration of autonomous States. For example, in addition to the 
Guarantee Clause, the Constitution empowers the States to 
                                                                                                        
 21. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 280, 282 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
1961). 
 22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
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prescribe the time, place, and manner of federal elections sub-
ject to congressional alteration.23 Such provisions serve as the 
Union’s shield to protect the federal republic against danger-
ous or uncooperative non-republican state governments. Pri-
marily, the Constitution directly governs state political struc-
tures as a federal check against state departures from 
republicanism that might jeopardize the national government. 
Outside of such threats, the Constitution reserves to the States 
a sphere of autonomy in formulating republicanism.24 
This federal conception of the republican guarantee is plural-
ist. Beyond the consensus of basic political equality, and con-
sistent with the security of the Union, pluralist republicanism 
allows states to adapt their forms of government to their own 
circumstances. These distinct republican forms mutually rein-
force and are reinforced by distinct political cultures arising in 
each state. An alternative national conception of the republican 
guarantee, one that exceeds the scope necessary for basic politi-
cal equality and the security of the union, might be called per-
fectionist. Rather than take the guarantee as a shield, perfec-
tionist republicanism takes it as a sword for the Union to attack 
state conceptions of republicanism that might differ from that 
of the Union, or those the Union’s officers (legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial) might think ought to be imposed on the 
States nationally. It nationalizes state politics by dissolving dis-
tinctions between the forms of government at the federal and 
state levels.25 In its most pronounced form, republican perfec-
tionism reads the Guarantee Clause to require the States to con-
                                                                                                        
 23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 24. The sphere is autonomous, not sovereign, due to Congress’s broad authority 
to displace state regulation of federal elections under the Elections Clause and 
prohibit state discrimination in voting under the voting rights amendments. See 
Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting 
Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2012). On differences between sovereignty 
and autonomy accounts, as well as the cooperative account, see Heather K. 
Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2012) (describing 
“the de jure autonomy associated with the sovereignty account; the de facto au-
tonomy associated with process federalism; and the power of the servant, which 
is the best way to conceptualize state power in cooperative federal regimes”). 
 25. The Author thanks Richard Pildes for clarifying the point that the argu-
ment’s concern is nationalization rather than federalization. See generally James A. 
Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National 
Colonization of State Politics, 29 J. L. & POL. 1 (2013). 
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fer positive rights that the Constitution does not require from 
the federal government. 
A. Republican Pluralism 
Republican pluralism recognizes that there is no definitive 
conception of a “Republican Form of Government.” In The Fed-
eralist, the guarantee’s co-drafter, Madison, described his view 
of a republic as simply “a government in which the scheme of 
representation takes place.”26 As Madison later suggests, this is 
not to distinguish a republic from what is popularly termed a 
democracy, a distinction that Akhil Amar notes “dissolves et-
ymologically, with the res publica being a rough Latin equiva-
lent of the Greek demos-kratia—rule by the demos, or people.”27 
Rather, as the guarantee’s neighboring protections “against In-
vasion” and “against domestic Violence”28 suggest, one of its 
purposes is “to defend the system against aristocratic or mo-
narchical innovations,” particularly factions that may “possess 
such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents 
and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers.”29 
Within this federally enforced safety, the States may continue 
“the existing republican forms,” or “choose to substitute other 
republican forms” so long as “they shall not exchange republi-
can for anti-republican Constitutions.”30 Outside of the scope of 
the guarantee, the States would retain electoral autonomy, as 
“the component parts of the State governments will in no in-
stance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of 
the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local in-
fluence of its members.”31 
                                                                                                        
 26. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 129, 133 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
1961). 
 27. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular 
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 
760 n.47 (1994). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 29. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 311, 313 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
1961). 
 30. Id. at 312. 
 31. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 327 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed. 
1961). For an important critique of this premise, see David Schleicher, Federalism 
and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing many state and 
local elections are “second order,” reflecting voter preferences about federal offi-
cials instead of the performance of state and local officials on the ballot). 
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The Federalist should be read cautiously as the political advo-
cacy it was, particularly when it promises to leave the States 
and their governments alone while seeking their joinder in the 
Union. Yet Robert Natelson’s thorough study of the original 
understanding of the Guarantee Clause also concludes that the 
Constitution provided little more guidance than to say, “With 
respect to republicanism, choose the form you wish, so long as 
your governments are controlled by your citizens, have no 
kings (or, by another clause, no titled nobility), and honor the 
rule of law.”32 Similarly, Akhil Amar finds in both its framing 
and its practice, “The central meaning of Republican Govern-
ment revolved tightly around popular sovereignty, majority 
rule, and the people’s right to alter or abolish.”33 There is “near-
consensus,” observes Jacob Heller, that “republican govern-
ments rule (1) by the majority (and not a monarch), (2) through 
elected representatives, [and] (3) in separate, coequal branch-
es.”34 This much of the Guarantee Clause is clear and even jus-
ticiable in those fortunately rare instances where these basic 
elements might be lacking.35 
The republicanism of the Guarantee Clause is therefore more 
practical than theoretical, more structural than rights-based, 
and focused on a self-sustaining polity, not political perfection-
                                                                                                        
 32. Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and 
the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 856 (2002); see also Michael 
W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 
24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 114 (2000) (“There are many systems of represen-
tation that would satisfy the Republicanism requirement. But at a minimum, the 
Clause must mean that a majority of the whole body of the people ultimately gov-
erns.”). 
 33. Amar, supra note 27, at 786. 
 34. Jacob M. Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee Clause Regula-
tion of State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2010). 
 35. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), the closest case in which an an-
tebellum Supreme Court (that is, one unconcerned about the deep betrayal of 
republicanism inherent in slavery) might have delivered on the guarantee, is 
plausibly read to be about “not whether [Rhode Island’s pre-revolutionary royal] 
charter regime was Republican, but whether it was a Government.” Amar, supra 
note 27, at 776. Adam Kurland provides a fascinating account of a potential invo-
cation of the guarantee in President Franklin Roosevelt’s consideration of another 
extreme case, “Huey Long and the ‘totalitarian’ state of Louisiana,” as well as 
more questionable cases of the House Un-American Activities Committee and the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See Adam H. Kurland, The 
Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 367, 446–52 (1989) (emphasis omitted). 
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ism. As Cass Sunstein explains, republicanism is an effort to 
realize “a virtuous politics . . . without indulging unrealistic 
assumptions about human nature.”36 The possibility of such a 
politics is modeled in the United States Constitution’s “com-
plex set of precommitment strategies, through which the citi-
zenry creates institutional arrangements to protect against po-
litical self-interest, factionalism, failures in representation, 
myopia, and other predictable problems in democratic govern-
ance.”37 As the broad text of the clause suggests, the diversity 
of the ratifying states’ forms of government confirms that the 
federal model was only one model, specially adapted to its fed-
eral functions, and not a casting mold to which the States 
would need to conform.38 The nation of state republicanisms 
under the Guarantee Clause is structuralist all the way down. 
This is not to say that republicanism is indeterminate. Con-
gress’s authoritative construction of the Guarantee Clause 
played a critical role in conditioning the admission and readmis-
sion of states during Reconstruction on suffrage for freed 
slaves.39 Since then, other constitutional provisions have refined 
the guarantee, expressly extending it to include all races,40 wom-
en,41 the poor,42 young adults,43 and the People directly in choos-
ing Senators.44 The Supreme Court supplemented these textual 
constitutional guarantees with long-established political rights 
                                                                                                        
 36. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 21 (1993). 
 37. Id. 
 38. “‘All the States had governments when the Constitution was adopted. In all 
the people participated to some extent, through their representatives elected in 
the manner specially provided. These governments the Constitution did not 
change. They were accepted precisely as they were, and it is, therefore, to be pre-
sumed that they were such as it was the duty of the States to provide. Thus we 
have unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form, within the meaning 
of that term as employed in the Constitution.’” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 
n.48 (1962) (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175–76 (1874)). 
 39. See Amar, supra note 27, at 780–82. 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (“The District 
constituting the seat of government of the United States shall appoint in such 
manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice 
President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress 
to which the District would be entitled if it were a State . . . .”). 
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derived from the First and Fourteenth Amendments, including 
the right to speak, associate, and petition on political issues, and 
a basic right to have one’s vote count equally. Richard Hasen 
identifies these as a concept of essential political rights, and his 
conception distinguishes these core equality principles as “basic 
political equality rights [that] are absolutely essential for any 
government to function as a democracy.”45 Together with the 
republican guarantee, these rights set a floor of basic political 
equality, above which states may adapt their own form of gov-
ernment consistent with their own conceptions of political equal-
ity and other republican values.46 
Beyond this consensus of basic political equality, republi-
canism is an essentially contested concept.47 No comprehen-
sive conception of republicanism can exist outside of how any 
particular political community defines it at a particular time 
in its development.48 At a national level, however, no such 
conception holds. At least as long as scholars have recognized 
election law as a distinct field, they have debated the conflict-
ing values republicanism is supposed to embody: accountabil-
ity and participation, majority rule and minority representa-
tion, deliberation and responsiveness, equality and liberty of 
influence, legitimacy and self-expression, competition and 
                                                                                                        
 45 . RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 79 (2003). 
 46. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: 
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1156 
(2002) (“[T]he Court in Baker set the floor for equality but not the ceiling. Presum-
ably, by setting the floor, the Court permitted state actors to provide greater polit-
ical equality, as many conceptions of political equality undoubtedly exist.”). 
 47. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE 
LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1 (1998) 
(“There are many possible forms democracy can take, many different institutional 
embodiments of democratic politics.”); Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court 
Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 283, 302 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002); 
Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999). 
 48. See Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 
SUP. CT. REV. 95, 152 (“Within the very broad outlines provided by the Constitu-
tion, courts should permit the political processes of local, state, and federal gov-
ernments to work out their own precise forms of representative (and direct) de-
mocracy. These forms will doubtless vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and 
change over time.”). 
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stability, and so on.49 Standard accounts trace at least three 
distinct and conflicting republicanisms—civic republicanism, 
libertarianism, and pluralism—to Madison himself. What dis-
tinguishes the republican pluralism described here from other 
perfectionist forms of republicanism in election law is the po-
litical community that defines it. While many accounts of elec-
tion law look to judges (usually federal judges) to weigh and 
resolve these conflicting republican values in state politics,50 
republican pluralism acknowledges the guarantee is a (one of 
many chosen by states), not the (one chosen by the federal 
government), republican form of government in the States. 
Republican pluralism is pluralist in the ordinary sense that a 
republican form of government may exist in many distinct 
forms consistent with republicanism. It is also pluralist in the 
theoretical sense of embracing pluralism in politics among the 
States. These republicanisms are politically contested. Once one 
form satisfies the broad constitutional requirements of the 
Guarantee Clause and basic political equality, there is no crite-
rion outside of politics itself to assess its desirability. In each 
state, that politics is partly a function of the republicanism it 
sustains. It is this latter theoretical sense that Bruce Cain em-
phasizes in proposing “reform pluralism,” meaning first “a 
more explicitly pluralist political reform agenda” that takes a 
                                                                                                        
 49. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 46, at 1142 (identifying key principles of “majori-
ty rule, political participation, accountability, responsiveness, substantial equality, 
and interest representation”); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Align-
ment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 356 (2014) (identifying, in addition to alignment of 
elected representatives with voter preferences, “protecting individual rights such 
as the franchise and the freedom to advocate one’s political views; promoting 
electoral competition, especially when there is a danger of incumbent entrench-
ment; increasing voter participation, turnout in particular; respecting the political 
equality of all citizens; and ensuring that minorities are represented adequately in 
the halls of power.”); see also Michael S. Kang, To Here from Theory in Election Law, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 787, 797 (2009) (reviewing HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY 
INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009)) (asking 
whether “what seem like uncontroversial values in proposing that eligible voters 
should be able to vote and that all valid votes should be counted . . . would be-
come intense partisan struggles over voter registration, identification, and fraud 
when the debate is made more specific”). 
 50. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 46, at 1162 (“[J]udges can—and must—utilize 
democratic theory to direct their interpretation of the Constitution.”). 
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realistic view of political contestation.51 Second, however, he 
also recommends “a blended approach” as “a kind of metaplu-
ralist principle” that recognizes the quantitatively plural dis-
tinctions a qualitatively pluralist politics creates when iterated 
across many governing institutions, including states.52 This Ar-
ticle prioritizes the quantitative pluralism (or “metapluralism”) 
reflected in the diversity of state republicanism forms and is 
more agnostic about the priority of qualitative pluralism 
among the possible republican values any one state realizes. 
B. Republican Perfectionism 
Compared with republican pluralism, republican perfectionism 
offers far more detailed (and contestable) constructions of the 
guarantee.53 The sheer diversity of these conceptions reflects deep 
disagreements about the constitutional regulation of politics in 
general and the relationship of judicial review to that task in par-
ticular. The Guarantee Clause is not indeterminate, and Richard 
Hasen may put it too strongly when he says, “‘Republicanism’ is 
an empty vessel to be filled by whatever individual right the par-
ticular writer desires the courts to enforce.”54 But as Hasen sug-
gests, any reading of the guarantee as a vessel for nationalizing 
individual civil rights (beyond individual political rights) misses 
its basic structural function as the Union’s shield and not a sword. 
The history of the guarantee provides the backdrop to contempo-
rary debates about republicanism that take place under more con-
tested clauses. 
                                                                                                        
 51. BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM 
QUANDRY 195 (2015); see also Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political 
Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 827 (2014) 
(“Unless we attend to the ways in which political power is actually mobilized, 
organized, exercised, and marshaled, then policy proposals based on an individu-
alistically driven vision of politics, or on non-grounded abstract democratic ideals 
such as ‘participation,’ or ‘equality,’ can perversely contribute to undermining our 
institutional capacity to govern.”). 
 52. CAIN, supra note 51. 
 53. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 34, at 1754–55. 
 54. Richard L. Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfilled: An 
Argument for the Continued Nonjusticiability of Guarantee Clause Cases, in THE POLIT-
ICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 75, 82 
(Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) (internal quotation marks 
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In the past half-century, the argument for using the guaran-
tee as the Union’s sword against the States begins with Arthur 
Bonfield’s hope expressed on the eve of Baker v. Carr that “the 
specific substance of republican government will be dictated by 
contemporary values.” 55  His argument for broader political 
rights guaranteed as a form of republican government extend-
ed from abolition of the poll tax, to universal free public educa-
tion, and then to “[e]qual access for all to housing, employ-
ment, education, transportation and numerous other 
things . . . .”56 This imperial conception of republicanism, Bon-
field conceded, “might interfere a great deal in the internal 
governance of the states.”57 More recently, Erwin Chemerinsky 
argues that the Guarantee Clause should be an additional re-
pository for federal courts to define and protect a similarly un-
enumerated, if not equally ambitious, set of “basic individual 
rights.”58 Thomas Berg proposes more modest national modifi-
cations of state republicanism under the Guarantee Clause.59 
Berg sees national republicanism as an avenue to enhance 
democratic deliberation in the states by limiting delegation of 
the legislative process and by strengthening rational basis re-
view of legislative results.60 However, these proposals are still 
quite remote from the core concerns of the clause. 
Some readings of the clause do use the guarantee less as a 
sword against the States and more as a shield to protect the Un-
ion, as well as particular conceptions of republicanism in the 
States. Adam Kurland, for example, argues that the clause pro-
vides a positive grant of power supporting federal anti-
corruption legislation directed at state and local officials that is 
broader than what the Commerce Clause may allow.61 Unlike 
other theories of republicanism, he is careful not to read too 
much into the guarantee beyond its provision of a rational basis 
                                                                                                        
 55. Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in 
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 560 (1962). 
 56. Id. at 564, 566. 
 57. Id. at 570. 
 58. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 869. 
 59. Thomas C. Berg, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial 
Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208, 242 (1987). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Kurland, supra note 35, at 446–52. 
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for such legislation.62 In view of recent and not-so-recent history, 
criminalizing corruption at the state and local level may well be 
rationally related to preserving majority rule in, and protecting 
the Union from, corrupt state and local officials.63 
Conversely, Deborah Jones Merritt argues for using the 
Guarantee Clause as a shield for state autonomy against en-
croachments on federalism values such as direct federal regula-
tion of state governments.64 Indeed, this latter interpretation is 
one of the few proposals to gain at least limited traction in the 
Supreme Court. In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion for the Court cited Merritt in partial support of an anti-
commandeering principle of federalism that ensures “state 
government officials remain accountable to the local elec-
torate.”65 This conception of the Guarantee Clause instantiates a 
particular form of limited federal power beyond Article I enu-
merations and the Tenth Amendment canon of construction, 
possibly as a way to rework intergovernmental immunities.66 
Yet these claims simply hand the inapt sword of republicanism 
from the Union to the States. Transforming the Guarantee 
Clause from a multipurpose tool for nationalizing rights into a 
multipurpose tool for decentralizing powers still misconceives 
the clause as a sword, not a shield. 
Merritt also makes a more structurally grounded argument 
concerning the Guarantee Clause’s relationship to other consti-
tutional provisions. She recognizes that the primary federal 
constitutional constraints on the States’ political structures are 
not found in the Guarantee Clause, but in other more direct 
requirements of basic political equality such as the Fourteenth, 
                                                                                                        
 62. Id. at 459. 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 446–49 (describing Governor-Senator Huey Long’s “totalitari-
an” state of Louisiana); Monica Davey & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Jury Finds Blago-
jevich Guilty of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/06/28/us/28blagojevich.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/549M-22CE] (“A jury 
on Monday convicted Rod R. Blagojevich, the former governor of Illinois, of a 
broad pattern of corruption, including charges that he tried to personally benefit 
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Senate.”). 
 64. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism 
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 69–70 (1988). 
 65. 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992). 
 66. Merritt, supra note 64, at 55–58. 
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Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments.67 Merritt argues that beyond these specific re-
quirements, “in the guarantee clause the United States promis-
es to secure each of the states the autonomy necessary to main-
tain a republican form of government.”68 According to Merritt, 
a republican government “is responsible to its voters rather 
than to any outside agency.”69 Therefore, “[i]n order to ensure 
that state and local governments remain responsive to their 
constituents, those citizens must have the power to choose the 
governmental forms that work best for them.”70 In other words, 
the conception of the Guarantee Clause as a national shield to 
protect the Union’s republicanism includes its guarantee that it 
will not be used as a sword to attack States’ republicanisms. 
Jacob Heller draws a similar distinction between “republi-
canism top-down and bottom-up,” 71  though he has greater 
concerns about the state of republicanism in the States. Argua-
bly dysfunctional state governments such as California’s lead 
him to several “top-down” uses of the Guarantee Clause as a 
sword. He would construe it to empower federal anti-
corruption legislation72 (following Adam Kurland),73 to require 
one-person one-vote apportionment 74 (following Michael 
McConnell), 75  and to support federal preclearance require-
ments for state election law changes under § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act 76  (following Richard Hasen). 77  Most ambitiously, 
Heller reads the clause to prohibit “legislative power grabs” 
that undermine the States’ administrative agencies78 and “bal-
lot-box budgeting” through California’s spending initiatives.79 
                                                                                                        
 67. Id. at 38–39. 
 68. Id. at 22. 
 69. Id. at 41. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Heller, supra note 34, at 1724–25. 
 72. Id. at 1752–53. 
 73. See Kurland, supra note 35, at 435–52. 
 74. Heller, supra note 34, at 1755–56. 
 75. See McConnell, supra note 32, at 105–06. 
 76. Heller, supra note 34, at 1756–57. 
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The first three applications qualify as core uses of the clause as 
a “shield” to protect the Union against non-republican forms of 
corrupt or non-majoritarian government in the States. The last 
two might qualify as a shield only in the extreme instances when 
it is clear, as Heller suggests, that a state’s republican form of 
government is suffering “death by a thousand cuts” through an 
excess of administrative and fiscal micromanagement by law 
and initiative.80 While Heller’s prescription may be overbroad 
with respect to the initiative process,81 it recognizes what most 
commentators miss in the text of the Guarantee Clause: that “[it] 
does not apply to those matters not touching on a state’s form of 
government[,]” such as public education or individual rights.82 
Like Merritt’s argument that the Guarantee Clause implies 
some level of state autonomy in choosing its republican form of 
government, Heller’s “bottom-up” approach would deny the 
federal government a sword against state governments in at 
least one notable application. In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 
Indians v. Superior Court,83 the California Supreme Court denied a 
tribe federal common-law sovereign immunity from a state po-
litical practices investigation, holding that the Guarantee Clause 
shielded the state’s political process from interference by federal 
immunity. 84  Heller argues, convincingly, that this use of the 
clause might serve as a model to shield state campaign finance 
laws from the same level of scrutiny applied to federal campaign 
finance laws.85 The federal government ideally represents the 
strongest republican form of government due to its own struc-
tural guarantees (including its enlarged sphere of representa-
tion) “that help prevent corruption from interfering with repre-
sentation or majority will.”86 As Madison originally recognized, 
the same cannot be said for the States, and strong federal consti-
tutional attacks against the States’ own anti-corruption shields 
                                                                                                        
 80. Id. at 1759. 
 81. Compare Heller, supra note 34, at 1759 with Natelson, supra note 32, at 831–35 
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 82. Heller, supra note 34, at 1760. 
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not only distort the republican principles embodied in the free-
dom of speech,87 but also may subvert the Guarantee Clause. 
An emergent case serves as a reminder of the potential perils 
that may arise from a perfectionist reading of the Guarantee 
Clause. A century ago, the Supreme Court rejected a Guarantee 
Clause challenge to Oregon’s initiative process.88 Notably, it 
did not do so on the grounds that the initiative was consistent 
with a republican form of government, but only that the ques-
tion was “embraced within the scope of the powers conferred 
upon Congress, and not therefore within the reach of judicial 
power,” potentially leaving the federal government open to 
regulate the state initiative process.89 Former Oregon Supreme 
Court Justice Hans Linde argues that the initiative, when “mis-
used” for certain purposes, violates the Guarantee Clause.90 
Apparently, no court had revisited this question until Kerr v. 
Hickenlooper, a challenge to Colorado’s “Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights” (TABOR) constitutional initiative. 91  On appeal, the 
Tenth Circuit held that the Guarantee Clause is judicially en-
forceable and, in light of the ample interpretative tools offered 
by originalism, susceptible to “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards.”92 The court was careful on an interloc-
utory appeal not to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim 
that TABOR “undermines the fundamental nature of the state’s 
Republican Form of Government,”93 but the Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment94 and remanded the case for further con-
sideration in light of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Inde-
pendent Redistricting Commission.95 Still, such a sweeping attack 
on a state constitution lies well beyond what is necessary for 
                                                                                                        
 87. See Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 413, 462–65 (2012). 
 88. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
 89. Id. at 151. 
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preservation of the Union or protection of basic political equali-
ty. It exemplifies republican perfectionism. 
II. THE NATIONALIZATION OF STATE POLITICS 
The lack of meaningful consensus on the interpretation of the 
republican guarantee among scholars has not prevented the 
national government from attempting to impose various ver-
sions of republicanism masquerading as other federal powers 
and rights. The dominant constitutional story tells of perfecting 
the processes of democracy through representation-reinforcing 
federal judicial intervention against legislation, especially state 
legislation, that distorts the political process. 96  An extended 
narrative includes congressional enactment and federal en-
forcement of voting rights and campaign finance reform legis-
lation and, more broadly, the proposal by Congress and ratifi-
cation by the States of constitutional amendments extending 
voting rights. Throughout, the Supreme Court, abetted by 
Congress (or the reverse, depending on the telling), champions 
the Constitution’s evolving promise of ever-more-equal citi-
zenship in an ever-more-perfect republic. 
This story, much of which has become true, is near its end. 
While substantial regression is unlikely given the hard-won 
settlement of basic political equality expressed in constitutional 
amendments and enforcing legislation,97 federal progress be-
yond this settlement has run its course under the current con-
stitutional regime. This settlement is the Union’s national 
shield against anti-republicanism, and it remains strong in 
guaranteeing within a reasonable range republican pluralism 
in the States. Beyond this shield, no clear or coherent constitu-
tional vision guides the Supreme Court or Congress to pick up 
the sword and fight for any particular republican perfection-
ism. If it ever did, process theory no longer constrains courts, 
no longer supports a consensus on its normative commitments, 
                                                                                                        
 96. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JU-
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and no longer provides usable policy guidance.98 To the contra-
ry, the constitutional law of the political process is highly con-
tested within the Supreme Court and between the Court and 
Congress. 
The story, termed “the constitutionalization of democratic 
politics,”99 may be better understood as the nationalization of 
state politics, defined broadly as the inclusion of the entire po-
litical structure of a state including its means of electing federal 
officials. The national government “did not just judicialize elec-
tion administration” and other aspects of state political struc-
ture, it “also federalized election litigation, moving much of it 
from state to federal courts.”100 What distinguishes the end of 
this story from its beginning is not that it is constitutional, but 
that it is national to the exclusion of, and often at the expense of, 
the states in a federal system. 
The nationalization project has not failed. Rather, it helped 
establish the basic political equality of previously unrepresent-
ed or underrepresented citizens.101 This strengthened the Un-
ion’s shield against sectionalism that denied broad classes of 
the national population representation in our national and state 
politics. It may be true that federal courts’ current construction 
of constitutional law “does both too much—by inappropriately 
extending rights doctrines into the design of democratic institu-
tions—and too little—by declining to address self-entrenching 
laws aggressively enough.”102 Yet given the nation’s substantial 
progress toward political equality, there is no longer reason to 
expect that the continued nationalization of state politics will 
do any better than devolution to the States at further advancing 
republican values, no matter how hard federal courts work to 
get the constitutional law right. At the same time, there are a 
number of reasons to expect that nationalization has done, and 
will continue to do, worse by imposing “constraints on what 
                                                                                                        
 98. See HASEN, supra note 45, at 4–6. 
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should be acceptable experimentation in the design of democ-
racy.”103 Attempts to perfect any single vision of republicanism 
on a national scale, rather than to sustain plural visions of re-
publicanism at the state scale, risk undermining the latter 
without achieving the former. The shield’s work is largely done 
in guaranteeing republican forms of government in the States, 
so it may be time for the Union to sheathe its sword. 
A. Congressional Nationalization 
Congress is responsible for the most concrete advancements of 
basic political equality through nationalization. Beyond the signif-
icant impact of the Voting Rights Act and subsequent relatively 
minor administrative reforms, 104  however, Congress’s greatest 
democratic achievements have been its partnerships with the 
States in amending the Constitution to establish a textual basis for 
basic political equality. Even with its own enforcement powers 
under those Amendments, its contribution does not extend far 
beyond the Voting Rights Act itself. Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,105 the Constitution’s most explicit and self-executing 
republican promise of an expanded franchise (though compro-
mised at the expense of women), has become a dead letter. 
Congress’s record in campaign finance reform is less inspir-
ing. Even where it has been bold, as with the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), it has not been particularly 
innovative. The centerpiece of Progressive Era campaign fi-
nance reform, the Corrupt Practices Act regulating corporate 
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 104. See, e.g., The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. 
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and other campaign funding, was not a product of the federal 
government. Instead, it was conceived in the States and widely 
adopted by the early twentieth century when federal campaign 
finance legislation was still in its self-regulatory infancy.106 Be-
yond BCRA, which the Supreme Court and the hydraulics of 
campaign finance107 largely thwarted, Congress has either pro-
ceeded incrementally (the Help America Vote Act in 2002) or 
reiteratively (the Voting Rights Act reauthorization in 2006). 
Even such modest advances seem ambitious relative to the cur-
rent pace and scope of federal legislation. 
More importantly for campaign finance and Congress’s struc-
turing of republicanism in general, the unintended system re-
sulting from the interaction of legislation, judicial review, and 
executive inaction is paralyzed by hyperpolarization that makes 
even minor reforms impossible.108 As Lawrence Lessig explains, 
“The forces that would block [reform] work well and effectively 
on Capitol Hill, and inside the Beltway. That is their home.”109 
For the few reforms where consensus might otherwise be possi-
ble, such as election assistance to states, malfunctioning budget 
and appointments processes prove insurmountable.110  
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B. Executive Nationalization 
The federal legislation with the most transformative potential 
in the areas of voting rights and campaign finance faces uneven 
enforcement in the executive branch. The Voting Rights Act 
produced a record of uneven enforcement, particularly under 
the now impotent preclearance requirements of Section 5.111 The 
lead enforcer and interpreter of federal campaign finance law, 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), is subject to partisan 
nonenforcement by its deadlocked design;112 the only serious 
dispute is whether that is a good or a bad thing. More work 
might be done on the causes and effects of partisan enforcement 
of federal election law, but suffice it to say that some campaign 
finance reform advocates view the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, or even the Internal Revenue Service, as a more 
promising enforcer of political transparency than the FEC.113 
C. Judicial Nationalization 
The Supreme Court stands at the center of the federal govern-
ment’s nationalization of state politics. Its banner was once the 
Carolene Products doctrine of heightened scrutiny for state legisla-
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tion that “restricts those political processes which can ordinarily 
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”114 
Yet even Reynolds v. Sims,115 the initial stage of clearing the most 
widespread political process blockage of malapportionment, did 
not advance any effective conception of republicanism beyond an 
important but technical rule of “one-person, one-vote” that has 
been overwhelmed by redistricting technology.116 
We are not likely to see the Court create a republican repre-
sentational principle on the scale of Reynolds again anytime soon. 
With one notable but self-limiting exception, 117  the Supreme 
Court has excused itself from the political thicket of justiciable 
political equality under the Fourteenth Amendment.118 More re-
cent racial and political gerrymandering cases suggest the reap-
portionment revolution’s legacy of a justiciable and substantive 
standard of political equality may not progress farther than a 
strict quantitative, not qualitative, standard. 119  Notably, the 
Court in Evenwel v. Abbott appeared to defer to the consensus 
practice in the States by rejecting a claim that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires states to use voter population, rather than 
total population, in apportioning state legislative districts. 120 
Once again, however, the unanimous judgment’s seeming en-
dorsement of that consensus concealed deep divisions in the 
                                                                                                        
 114. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 115. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 116. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1993). 
 117. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 118. But see Ne. Ohio Coal. For the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 
2012) (holding that denial of the vote for voting at the wrong polling place due to 
poll worker error violated the Equal Protection Clause); Obama for Am. v. 
Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that contracting the early voting 
period for all voters except certain military voters violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). These cases may represent a kind of republican pluralism to the extent 
they arise from panels of regionally based circuit courts, rather than the central-
ized Supreme Court. 
 119. See Ala. Leg. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1272 (2015) (re-
manding potential racial gerrymandering claims for district-by-district reconsid-
eration, and reserving the question whether intentional use of race in redistricting 
triggers strict scrutiny). 
 120. Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2016), slip op. at 18 (“Adopting 
voter-eligible apportionment as constitutional command would upset a well-
functioning approach to districting that all 50 States and countless local jurisdic-
tions have followed for decades, even centuries.”).  
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Court’s approach to state republicanism. It drew a concurrence 
from Justice Thomas that invoked the Guarantee Clause directly: 
 As the Framers understood, designing a government to 
fulfill the conflicting tasks of respecting the fundamental 
equality of persons while promoting the common good re-
quires making incommensurable tradeoffs. For this reason, 
they did not attempt to restrict the States to one form of 
government. Instead, the Constitution broadly required that 
the States maintain a “Republican Form of Government.” 
But the Framers otherwise left it to States to make tradeoffs 
and reconcile the competing goals.121 
The relative uniformity of state apportionment practices al-
lowed the Court in Evenwel to avoid a choice between respect-
ing state practices as legitimate expressions of diverse republi-
can pluralism on the one hand, and using those practices as 
evidence of uniform republican perfectionism on the other. It 
remains to be seen which approach will predominate if and 
when a state departs from the consensus practice.  
The Court’s other interventions in political party, ballot ac-
cess, and voting administration cases work only at the margins 
of a complex system of partisan politics, and as with gerry-
mandering, the Court has signaled its reluctance to intervene 
further.122 Even setting aside its long history of narrowly con-
struing possible constitutional bases for expanding the fran-
chise, the Court’s record on Congress’s constitutional extension 
                                                                                                        
 121. Id. slip op. at 12 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted); 
see also id. slip op. at 2–3 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[An argument 
that the Constitution requires either population-based or voted-based apportion-
ment] implicates very difficult theoretical and empirical questions about the na-
ture of representation. For centuries, political theorists have debated the proper 
role of representatives, and political scientists have studied the conduct of legisla-
tors and the interests that they actually advance. We have no need to wade into 
these waters in this case, and I would not do so.”). With similar concern, Derek 
Muller notes that the Court’s opinion in Evenwel “used strong language on its 
views of political theory . . . as if these were the Court’s settled beliefs on how 
political representation ought to be.” Derek Muller, Response, Evenwel v. Abbott, 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.gwlr.org/evenwel-v-
abbott-a-new-attempt-to-define-one-person-one-vote/ [http://perma.cc/45FB-
HVW2]. See generally Derek T. Muller, Perpetuating “One Person, One Vote” Errors, 
39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371 (2016).  
 122. See Wash. St. Grange v. Wash. St. Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008); 
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
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of voting rights is mixed.123 In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court 
exposed basic disagreements about the role of Congress and 
itself in assessing, let alone guaranteeing, political equality in 
the States.124 In so doing, it revealed again that the Court partic-
ipates in, rather than adjudicates, the contest between particu-
lar forms of republicanism at the national level. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical attraction of extending judi-
cial representation-reinforcement to police the political process 
further, the actual Court has provided little reason to believe it 
could articulate and implement a coherent theory of republican-
ism.125 The Court may not do much better than the current state 
political institutions it polices so as to justify displacing them.126 
Indeed, as Edward Foley argues, “[T]here is no guarantee that 
constitutional constraints designed to curb partisan favoritism in 
the legislature will be implemented in a nonpartisan manner by 
conventional courts, whether elected or appointed.”127 Beyond 
enforcing the thin settlement of basic political equality achieved 
through constitutional amendments credited equally to Con-
gress and to some measure the ratifying states, the Court as an 
institution has proven itself incapable of nationalizing state poli-
tics to the end of perfecting any particular form of republican-
ism. The incoherence is as broad as it is deep, extending to com-
prehensively researched yet divided decisions on fundamental 
questions of politics like term limits and pamphleteering.128 
                                                                                                        
 123. Compare Harper v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) with Oregon 
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 124. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 125. Campaign finance is a leading example. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens 
United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011). 
 126. See Richard L. Hasen, Judges as Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for 
Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PRO-
CESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 101 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, 
Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011). 
 127. Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 139, 
144 (2013). 
 128. For two notable examples occurring in a single Term, see U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (invalidating state term limits for federal offi-
cials under the Qualifications Clauses by a vote of 5-4, with detailed examinations 
of history and practice on both sides); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334 (1995) (invalidating ballot issue campaign attribution law under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments by a vote of 7-2, with Justice Thomas concurring 
and Justice Scalia dissenting on originalist grounds). For a more recent example, 
see Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (upholding state law allowing ballot issue 
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Meanwhile, the Court’s scrutiny of modern campaign fi-
nance reform efforts has transformed the First Amendment’s 
republican values of democratic opportunity into libertarian 
values of a pluralist political marketplace.129 According to the 
Court’s view in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
“[d]emocracy is premised on responsiveness[,]” and “[i]t is in 
the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, 
and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contribu-
tors who support those policies.”130 Although the dissent cred-
ited the majority with entrenchment concerns reflecting a 
broader republican suspicion of “an incumbency protection 
plan,” it had to turn to an earlier case to find them.131 The Court 
extended its pluralist (but not pluralism-respecting) theory of 
representation in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, a 
case involving the right of a constituent of one representative to 
contribute to an unlimited number of representatives of other 
constituencies, with what appears to be a bold reframing of the 
American tradition of representation: “[C]onstituents [of the 
government but not of the candidate] support candidates who 
share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected 
can be expected to be responsive to those [donors’ not constitu-
ents’] concerns.”132 The Court’s general theory of republicanism 
expressed in these campaign finance cases supports its easy 
elision of federal and state politics133 and may undermine fed-
eralism by opening the States’ distinct republicanisms to fur-
ther nationalizing forces.134 
                                                                                                        
signature petition disclosure by an 8-1 vote, but splintering into four concurrences 
joined by six justices and a dissent). 
 129. See Johnstone, supra note 87. 
 130. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (quoting 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing in part)). 
 131. Id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 132. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). 
 133. See Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per 
curiam) (holding that “[t]here can be no serious doubt” that the Court’s analysis 
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 applies identically to Montana’s 
popularly enacted Corrupt Practices Act of 1912); see generally Anthony Johnstone, 
The State of the Republican Form of Government in Montana, 74 MONT. L. REV. 5 
(2013). 
 134. See Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 
EMORY L.J. 781 (2014) (arguing that the rise of Super PAC spending of unlimited 
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In one recent case, a different composition of the Court sug-
gested it may be unwilling, in some circumstances, to move 
state election law further toward nationalization. Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission pre-
sented the question of whether an independent redistricting 
commission enacted by popular initiative qualified under the 
Elections Clause as a “Legislature” competent to prescribe the 
“Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections.135 In 
Madison’s terms, the case asked whether the Constitution uses 
“Legislature” in the Elections Clause in a national sense (for the 
nation) or a federal sense (for the state in confederation). De-
spite the apparently clear text, and with the benefit of a close 
analysis of constitutional structure and history, the Court read 
the Clause in its federal sense, and left to the States the power 
to govern federal elections—in the absence of congressional 
action—according to their own view of the legislative power in 
a republic.  
Other cases on the horizon will present similar questions and 
again invite the Court to nationalize new rules of state republi-
canism. The Court avoided reaching the merits of Kerr v. Hick-
enlooper, but not without acknowledging the potential justicia-
bility of its Guarantee Clause claim in a footnote to Arizona 
State Legislature.136 That provocative citation, and Justice Thom-
as’s invocation of the Guarantee Clause in Evenwel, suggests 
the Court will continue to engage the arguments between re-
publican perfectionism and republican pluralism, perhaps with 
a helpful return to the constitutional text. As the Court recon-
siders the justiciability of the Guarantee Clause, its text serves 
as an important reminder of its function as the Union’s shield 
for the defense against anti-republicanism in the States, and not 
as the Union’s sword for the imposition of a particular republi-
canism on the States. 
                                                                                                        
amounts across state lines erodes the links between federal representatives and 
their state constituencies, weakens parties as a vector for influence by state parties 
over national politics, and may drown out traditional intergovernmental lobbies 
that speak for the States). 
 135. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 136. Id. at 2660 n.3 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992)) 
(“[P]erhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable po-
litical questions.”). 
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III. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF STATE REPUBLICANISMS 
National republicanism may be incoherent, but is state politics 
any different or better? Distinct state republicanism may be 
merely a romantic notion overtaken by centralizing legal and 
political forces.137 Once, perhaps, states constituted distinct polit-
ical communities, but those were long ago displaced by factional 
interests working on a national scale. On this account, the mobil-
ity of individuals, parties, and campaign funds renders states as 
scenery on the national political stage. More pessimistically, 
even if states satisfy the constitutional requirements of basic po-
litical equality, distinct state republicanism only masks the parti-
san capture of state election laws for purely factional ends.138 
Drawing on Madison’s suspicion of the factional disease afflict-
ing state politics, this account finds the necessary republican 
cure at the national level. As bad as it might be at the national 
level, the argument goes, it is worse in the States. 
Like other claims grounded in federalism principles, the ex-
istence and desirability of republican pluralism in the States 
depends on a significant degree of state autonomy in formulat-
ing election law. That legal autonomy must be more than theo-
retical or merely out of lockstep with federal law. It should be 
demonstrated in practice, producing “laboratories of democra-
cy” in the truest sense of those words. That legal practice 
should be consequential, associated with diverse political cul-
tures either preserved by or producing distinct systems of elec-
                                                                                                        
 137. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political 
Parties, and the National Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & POL. 1 (2013) (arguing 
that the rise of the national political parties has led to the colonization of state 
politics to the exclusion of political autonomy); Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (arguing 
that states do not constitute significant political communities distinct from the 
national political community). 
 138. In an illuminating argument, Yasmin Dawood defines and criticizes the 
“partisan state,” where partisanship not only dominates “first-order” general 
policy consistently with democratic theory, but also dominates “second-order” 
electoral policy inconsistently with self-government. Yasmin Dawood, Democracy 
and the Problem of the Partisan State, in LOYALTY: NOMOS LIV 257, 258–59 (Sanford 
Levinson et al. eds., 2013); see also Joshua Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run 
Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553 (arguing federal judicial deference has encour-
aged states to adopt laws rigged to benefit the party in power); Justin Levitt, Elec-
tion Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97 
(2012). 
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tion law. Only then, if states are both legally and culturally dis-
tinctive, can we turn to an assessment of whether those distinc-
tions are valuable to state and national politics. 
It is worth asking, when we are this far along in the nationali-
zation of state politics, if distinct state political cultures with dis-
tinct state conceptions of republicanism are becoming obsolete. 
The same financial and political forces that drive federal grid-
lock push money, political consultants, campaign advertising, 
and increasingly legislation out to the States, while exerting a 
gravitational pull on state-level politicians toward Washington, 
D.C. Recently, William Marshall concluded, “The uniqueness of 
a state’s political culture and therefore the need to preserve 
it . . . may be rapidly becoming a relic of the past.”139 Yet the per-
sistence of states as distinct political systems—the persistence of 
republican pluralism—is hard-wired into national politics in 
several constitutional and extra-constitutional ways. Most obvi-
ously, after all the outside campaign money is spent, even Con-
gress still must be elected “by the People of the several States,” 
and presidential electors must be appointed in a manner di-
rected by state legislatures.140  Aside from this basic electoral 
connection, the discussion below reviews the range of policies 
and practices in which states remain distinct from each other 
and from the national government. 
The strongest claim opposing distinct state republicanisms, 
that we have only one national republicanism, is overstated at 
least. National republicanism relies on distinct state rules for 
voting qualifications, election administration, political party 
organization, and districting. Even the broadest federal 
preemption under the Elections Clause, by a hypothetical Con-
gress with an unprecedented appetite for centralization, could 
                                                                                                        
 139. William P. Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: 
Should Differences in a State’s Political History and Culture Matter?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 
79, 100 (2013). 
 140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
Notably, the slates of presidential electors are determined by nominating prima-
ries and caucuses held in just a handful of states at a time and controlled by each 
state’s distinct political party structure. The first states to cast votes are culturally 
distinct from the nation as a whole. See Asma Khalid, The Perfect State Index: If 
Iowa, N.H. Are Too White To Go First, Then Who?, NPR.ORG (Jan. 29, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/01/29/464250335/the-perfect-state-index-if-iowa-n-h-are-
too-white-to-go-first-then-who [http://perma.cc/2EHE-GH2S]. 
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not entirely displace the States’ role in national elections. Prac-
tically, moreover, “Congress has left much of its arguable pow-
er over election law on the table unused . . . .”141 In state elec-
tions, local campaign finance and lobbying laws come into 
play, as does a typically longer slate of elected offices and 
broader calendar of election dates. It is possible that pressure 
from national parties and interest groups could compress any 
possible political distinctions into an undifferentiated mass of 
election law reflecting a national republicanism. But the poli-
cies and practices in the States do not bear this out. There re-
main important, persistent distinctions among the legal re-
gimes of state republicanisms, and these regimes produce and 
are preserved by distinct political cultures. 
A. Legal Distinctions 
An American today experiences more variation in elections 
than she does in just about any other aspect of her participation in 
mass culture, from what is playing on the radio when the alarm 
goes off, to the coffee shop, to the morning commute, to the 
workplace, to the lunch out, to the shopping trip on the way 
home, to the street where she lives. Within broad ranges of urban, 
suburban, and rural culture, these ordinary experiences may be 
indistinguishable. Yet on Election Day, everything changes. 
Most of these distinctions are not merely functions of election 
officials’ competence or best practices. There are vast and trou-
bling variations in competence, to be sure. The legitimate 
breadth of these policy variations is telling, however. The lead-
ing bipartisan and nonpartisan efforts at election reform reach 
consensus on a number of effective “one size fits all” election 
metrics and rules, but they avoid the deeper value judgments 
(or partisan calculations) reflected in voter ID laws or particu-
lar means of early voting, let alone party rules and campaign 
                                                                                                        
 141. Kirsten Nussbaumer, The Election Law Connection and U.S. Federalism, 43 
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 392, 395 (2013) (arguing that Congress forbears because 
state legislators represent an important constituency for members of Congress, 
who may owe their careers not only to their formative years of work within the 
state party, but also the formation of favorable constituencies through the redis-
tricting process). 
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finance regulation.142 Nor are these distinctions simply a func-
tion of partisanship. For most election rules, significant varia-
tions occur among red and blue states, and within regions. 
1. Election Administration 
“Election Day” itself varies significantly among states. Pri-
mary campaigns kick off nearly a year before the election for 
March primaries in Illinois and Texas. They kick off in Septem-
ber, just two months before the general election primary, in 
Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. 
Louisiana holds no primary, but holds a runoff election in De-
cember if necessary.143  General election campaigns therefore 
can run between two and nine months, depending on the state. 
Two-thirds of states offer some form of early voting, beginning 
an average of 22 days before the election and as early as 45 
days before the election.144 Twenty-two states allow early vot-
ing on weekends.145 Twenty-seven states allow “no-excuse” ab-
sentee voting by mail, and three states (Colorado, Washington, 
and Oregon) require voting by mail.146 
Once the traditional Election Day arrives, eleven states pro-
vide same-day registration.147 A citizen is more likely to be reg-
istered to vote already in Mississippi (84% registration) and 
Colorado (74% registration) than if she lived next door in Ar-
kansas (65% registration) or Wyoming (64% registration); vot-
                                                                                                        
 142. See ROBERT F. BAUER, ET AL., THE PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION AD-
MIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION (2014); PEW CEN-
TER ON THE STATES, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
AVAILABLE DATASETS AND HOW TO USE THEM (2012).  
 143. 2014 Calendar: State Primary Dates and Runoff Dates, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/2014-state-primary-dates-and-runoff.aspx [http://perma.cc/H9T9-
NUP8]. 
 144. Absentee and Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 11, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-
voting.aspx [http://perma.cc/X4H3-S8J2]. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Same Day Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 2, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registrati 
on.aspx [http://perma.cc/4LRL-BPM7]. 
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ers need not register at all in North Dakota.148 In states where 
there are still polling locations, opening hour varies from as 
early as 5 a.m. in Vermont (6 a.m. in ten other states) to as late 
as 11 a.m. in neighboring New Hampshire, and closing hour 
varies from as early as 6 p.m. in Hawaii and Kentucky to as late 
as 9 p.m. in Iowa, New York, and North Dakota.149 A voter may 
wait to vote only a few minutes in Mississippi or New Jersey, 
but half an hour or longer in Florida or Maryland.150 In the 2014 
election, 31 states required voter identification, ten of which 
had a requirement that a voter without identification take addi-
tional action after Election Day for a provisional ballot to be 
counted.151 Fifteen of these voter identification states required 
photo ID while sixteen accepted photo or non-photo IDs.152 In 
local and special district elections, nonresidents may vote in 
twelve states, and non-citizens may vote in a small but growing 
number of localities.153 Convicted felons can vote from prison 
in Maine and Vermont, but may never vote again in twelve 
states with permanent felon disenfranchisement where ineligi-
ble felons may make up as much as ten percent of the voting 
age population.154 
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its voting-age population, Mississippi 8%, and Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia 
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2. Constituencies and Districting 
One of the most fundamental and contested questions of rep-
resentation, the choice between size of constituency and size of 
legislative body, is answered in a variety of ways by the States. 
State senates range from as large as sixty-three (New York) and 
sixty-seven (Minnesota) to as small as twenty (Alaska) and 
twenty-one (Delaware and Nevada). 155  State houses and as-
semblies range from as large as 400 (New Hampshire) to as low 
as forty (Alaska), forty-one (Delaware), and forty-two (Neva-
da); Nebraska lacks a lower house. 156  Senate constituencies 
range from more than 800,000 (Texas) and 900,000 (California) 
to less than 14,000 (North Dakota). 157  House constituencies 
range from more than 465,000 in California to less than 10,000 
in Montana, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wyo-
ming.158 California’s average assembly constituency is the only 
constituency close in size to a congressional district, and more 
than 100 times larger than the house constituencies in New 
Hampshire (3,291) and Vermont (4,172).159 The smallest seven 
state houses and smallest five state senates today are smaller 
than the U.S. House and Senate, respectively, in 1789.160 Seven-
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chised felons in 2014 as high as 4% of voting-age population in Georgia, with sev-
en other states at 2% or more: Mississippi, Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Arkansas, 
Texas, and Louisiana. See Michael P. McDonald, 2014 November General Election 
Turnout Rates, UNITED STATES ELECTIONS PROJECT (Dec. 30, 2014), 
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teen states have house constituencies smaller than the 30,000 
minimum the Constitution sets for Congress.161 
All state legislators have either two- or four-year terms,162 
and nearly all state executive officers have four-year terms.163 
Beginning in 1990 with California, Colorado, and Oklahoma, 
and ending with Nebraska in 2000, twenty-two states enacted 
term limits on executive or legislative officials by statutory or 
constitutional initiative.164 Combined with pre-existing execu-
tive term limits, thirty-seven states limit the term of their gov-
ernor and other executive branch officials.165 Four states invali-
dated term limits by state supreme court decision, and another 
two repealed them by legislative action.166 The wave of term 
limit laws represents one of the more successful recent efforts 
to nationalize state politics from the bottom up. 
Redistricting—the state practice that may have the most direct 
effect on the composition of the national government—exhibits 
notable differences among the States. A slight majority of states 
leave redistricting in the control of the state legislature, although 
Iowa takes exceptional measures to cleanse the legislature’s pro-
cess of partisanship through legislative staff analysis of plans. 
Twenty-one states rely on some form of redistricting commis-
sion, though these commissions vary in independence.167 In thir-
teen states, a commission has primary authority for drawing up 
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the redistricting plan. In three states, a commission has advisory 
authority only. In five states, a commission serves as a backup in 
the event the legislature is unable to finalize a plan. Eight states 
form their redistricting commissions by legislative appoint-
ment,168 and eight more rely on mixed appointments by the ex-
ecutive branch or a combination of executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches or state party leaders.169 Four states form com-
missions from executive branch officials, and two include legis-
lative leadership.170 One, California, uses a citizens’ redistricting 
commission chosen by lottery. 171  Most states rely on single-
member districts after a slow decline of multi-member districts 
in the wake of the reapportionment revolution and subsequent 
voting rights litigation.172 Yet, ten states continue to use multi-
member districts, ranging from two to eleven representatives 
each, in one or both houses of the state legislature.173 
3. Parties 
Party regulation provides both an opportunity for variation 
among states and additional opportunities for innovations by 
individual parties within states. Nominating conventions are 
permitted for major and minor parties in twenty-two states.174 
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These conventions, which act like small-scale primaries, can 
serve as a testing ground for new voting methods, such as vot-
ing by mail, internet voting, and instant runoff voting.175 Eleven 
states hold open primaries, eleven states hold closed primaries, 
four states (including Nebraska’s nonpartisan legislature) hold 
top-two primaries, and the remaining states hold some combi-
nation of primaries.176 Most states use a plurality rule, but elev-
en states hold runoff elections for various offices.177 Primaries 
exert their strongest disciplining effect in the forty-seven states 
that have some sort of sore loser laws; these laws spread rela-
tively recently through the states between 1976 and 1994.178 
Meanwhile, state voter registration laws and a variety of poll-
ing place affiliation processes can strengthen or weaken par-
ties’ control of membership and the extent to which the parties 
can effectively close their own primaries.179 As of 2014, thirty 
states provided for party affiliation in voter registration. Affili-
ations range from 51% and 65% Republican (Kansas and Wyo-
ming, respectively) to 54% and 55% Democrat (Kentucky and 
Maryland, respectively).180 Unaffiliated voters vary more wide-
ly, ranging from 8% in Kentucky to 92% in Arkansas. In the 
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1990s, twenty states offered straight-ticket voting, but only ten 
do now.181 
Given the Supreme Court’s recognition of political parties’ 
expressive association rights, state primary law often serves as 
only a default option subject to modification by individual par-
ties. In ten states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Washing-
ton), one party chooses to operate its primary differently from 
how the other party operates its primary.182  Notably, in all 
these states but one the Republican Party opts for closed pri-
maries while the Democratic Party opts for a more open option; 
only in blue Hawaii does the Democratic Party close its prima-
ry while the Republicans keep theirs open.183 These choices by 
party organizations, as well as legislation by the party in office, 
both track and shape the party dynamics within each state, 
with sometimes surprising divergences between the two. In 
one recent example, Idaho’s Republican Party sued its stand-
ard-bearer Secretary of State Ben Ysursa. In the case, the Party 
succeeded in persuading a federal court to implement, under 
the First Amendment, a party closed-primary rule that its legis-
lative supermajorities would not enact.184 A Republican legisla-
tor in neighboring Montana also sued to close that state’s pri-
maries, with the support of the state party organization but not 
all of the Republican state legislators.185 However, in Hawaii, a 
Democratic version of the Idaho strategy has so far been un-
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successful in voiding that state’s constitutional requirement for 
an open primary.186 
4. Campaign Finance 
Perhaps the widest variation among state election law regimes 
appears in campaign finance law. Although most prominent 
discussions about campaign finance concern federal Super PACs 
and 501(c)(4) organizations, most campaign financing is con-
ducted under state law for state elections. During the last major 
gubernatorial cycle in 2014, in which thirty-four of the fifty states 
held elections for governor, state candidates and committees (in-
cluding ballot issue committees) raised  $3.2 billion—a conserva-
tive estimate that excludes some independent expenditures and 
electioneering.187 Despite these exclusions, and the fact that one-
third of the States did not hold top-tier elections that year, the 
figure is still close to the nearly $3.6 billion in contributions to 
the 2012 federal presidential and congressional campaigns.188 
Over the most recent completed four-year cycle of 2011-2014, 
state campaign contributions amounted to nearly $7 billion,189 
outpacing estimated total federal campaign contributions of 
nearly $6.4 billion that same cycle.190 State campaign finance and 
campaign finance law matter. 
States are evenly split in their choices of campaign finance 
rules. Individual contribution limits for 2015–2016 range from 
approximately $50,000 in New York to $500 in Alaska (for gov-
ernor) and $12,532 in Ohio to $170 in Montana (for state legisla-
ture, per election).191 Twelve states allow unlimited individual 
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contributions.192 Twenty-two states prohibit corporate contribu-
tions to candidates, while six allow unlimited corporate contri-
butions.193 Five states (Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, and West Virginia) permit union contributions while 
prohibiting corporate contributions, while New Hampshire 
prohibits union contributions while permitting corporate con-
tributions.194 Twenty-eight states limit state party contributions 
to candidates, but those limits range from the same few hun-
dred or few thousand dollars as individual limits to hundreds 
of thousands of dollars (per election) or more than a million 
dollars per cycle.195 In addition to the three fully funded cam-
paign “clean election” states (Arizona, Connecticut, and 
Maine), ten other states offer other public financing programs 
for some or all state offices.196 Beyond these highlights, there 
are innumerable other distinctions in regulation of coordina-
tion rules, electioneering expenditures, attribution, and so on. 
In an era where many campaigns abandon the traditional polit-
ical committee form, state corporate law adds a new layer of 
complexity to both state and federal campaigns.197 
All fifty states require candidate contribution disclosure, 
though reporting periods range from monthly throughout an 
election year, weekly and daily as the election approaches (Al-
abama and Arkansas), to once per primary and general election 
(Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Wisconsin, 
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and Wyoming), sometimes with a post-election report. 198  A 
quarter of states do not require regular reports from political 
action committees.199 Most states now require some form of in-
dependent expenditure disclosure from groups other than reg-
istered political committees, with triggers ranging from zero-
dollar disclosure (Alaska, Georgia, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Tennessee, and Wyoming) to $5,000 (Arizona, Florida, 
and Oklahoma) and $10,000 per four-year cycle in Maryland.200 
In setting disclosure thresholds for individual contributions, 
many states gravitate toward the $100 level regardless of elec-
torate or campaign size.201 Thresholds range from “zero-dollar” 
disclosure of the name and address of any campaign contribu-
tor in Florida, Michigan, and New Mexico regardless of contri-
bution amount,202 to a $300 contribution disclosure threshold in 
New Jersey and $200 threshold in Mississippi, North Dakota, 
and West Virginia.203 
A subtler but critical legal distinction is enforcement of cam-
paign finance and related laws. Again, there is no dominant 
practice in the States, neither in terms of methodology or effi-
cacy. Robert Huckshorn studied state campaign finance en-
forcement in the 1980s and concluded that, of the 26 states with 
election commissions at the time, there were two distinct 
groups: “(1) those which are empowered to enforce the law, 
but, for one reason or another, have an established history of 
limited enforcement or nonenforcement; and (2) those commis-
sions possessing powers of enforcement which exercise them 
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on a regular basis.”204 Two decades later, Todd Lochner studied 
education, auditing, and penalty enforcement of state cam-
paign finance agencies and still found significant variation.205 
More recently, often obscure appointed state campaign practic-
es commissions have shared the spotlight with aggressive en-
forcement of disclosure law by elected state attorneys general 
who possess broad supervisory powers over nonprofit organi-
zations.206 Beyond law enforcement, other state officials may be 
responsible for—and more or less effective at—ensuring cam-
paign finance and related reports are disclosed to the public. 
5. Other Factors 
After Election Day, many other factors interact with election 
law to influence the form of a state’s republicanism. Are the 
legislators full-time or part-time?207 How often do they meet? 
What are their salaries? What professional staff is available? 
How open are meetings? How public are documents? How is 
lobbying defined? How is it regulated? How strict or loose are 
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ethics laws? How does the state regulate procurement? What 
kind of civil service and whistleblower protections are there? 
Who enforces state ethics and lobbying laws? How engaged 
with state government are federal and state anti-corruption law 
enforcers? These questions are the building blocks of perennial 
state report cards on ethics and corruption. The inconsistency 
of state “grades” across reports suggests how complicated each 
state’s political culture may be.208 For example, a recent com-
prehensive study of state public integrity laws ranked New Jer-
sey and Illinois in the top ten and the Dakotas near the bottom, 
in part because states with a history of corruption are more 
likely to legislate on public integrity while in smaller states 
“libertarian[] roots, a small-town, neighborly approach to gov-
ernment and the honest belief that ‘everybody knows every-
body’ has overridden any perceived need for strong protec-
tions in law.”209 These studies necessarily reflect the subjective 
judgments of their authors, and only begin to capture the com-
plexity of a state’s resulting political culture. 
B. Rules, Regimes, and Systems of Republicanism 
There are sharp and persistent distinctions among the indi-
vidual rules that structure state forms of republicanism and 
similarly sharp and persistent distinctions between those state 
rules and the rules that structure our national republicanism. 
By and large, the distinctions cut across big and small states, 
urban and rural states, and red and blue states. They represent 
the accretion of decades, and in some cases centuries, of consti-
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tutional and statutory traditions and adaptations. While waves 
of national political or legal reforms sometimes introduce new 
rules, some states lead those reforms, some states follow, and 
other states resist or retrench after a time. These distinctions 
extend beyond just a few outlier states. Across an array of rule 
choices, states either spread out across the continuum of poten-
tial rules, or divide into two or three relatively evenly sized 
camps. Despite recent trends toward the nationalization of 
state politics, and accounting for the recognition of basic politi-
cal equality, state republicanisms are as diverse as ever. 
These distinct rules alone complicate any attempt to character-
ize state republicanism. Such variation has facilitated a develop-
ing political science literature about the impact of particular 
rules on various republican values. Any summary citation 
would be incomplete, though Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Eric M. 
McGhee, and Steven Rogers assemble many of the recent find-
ings in their comprehensive analysis of the effect of electoral 
rules on representation and the other questions that arise from 
the study of republican pluralism in the States.210 Rule-level ef-
fects, when they exist, run in the low single-digit percentages. 
Yet as the discussion above suggests, the function of republican-
ism in the States is multivariate. Each state develops its own re-
gime of rules to govern any particular element of election law. 
These regimes can produce interaction effects that aggravate or 
mitigate the impact of the component rules. Republican plural-
ism attends to the variation among state systems that cannot be 
explained by changes in a single rule or even a single regime. 
In election administration, some states may pair early voting 
with strict voter identification requirements, while others limit 
early voting but provide a relatively convenient process at the 
polls. In legislative composition, states may reduce the impact 
of turnover from term limits with small houses that facilitate 
trust among members or incumbent-protective redistricting 
processes, while others may increase that impact with larger 
houses and a more competitive redistricting process. Political 
parties may be able to elect purer candidates in states that 
combine closed primaries, party affiliation in voter registration, 
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plurality rules, and sore loser laws than in states that lack one 
or more of those rules. In campaign finance, states may concen-
trate fundraising on candidate campaigns by combining high 
candidate contribution limits with strong enforcement of inde-
pendent expenditure disclosure, or divert campaign contribu-
tions into undisclosed expenditures by adopting the opposite 
regime.211 Public integrity factors like lobbying regulation, eth-
ics rules, and transparency can work in combination to foster a 
culture of integrity, or undercut it. 
At the state level, multiple regimes form a system that inter-
acts with factors like demographics, economics, and geography 
to constitute a state’s republican form of government. Consider, 
for example, the system of interactions between a state’s party 
regulation regime and its campaign finance regime. The regimes 
may complement each other to increase party control of candi-
dates in a system of closed primaries, high contribution limits 
for parties, and strong regulation of independent expenditures. 
They may also complement each other to decrease party control 
with open primaries, low contribution limits for parties, and un-
regulated independent expenditures. Some mix of regimes may 
produce a system that exacerbates polarization, perhaps with 
closed primaries and low contribution limits, but unregulated 
independent expenditures, or fosters moderation, perhaps with 
open primaries and unlimited contributions to candidates or 
parties that dry up independent expenditures. Neither party 
regulation nor campaign finance regimes alone are likely to ac-
complish their individual purposes without being amplified or 
undercut by interactions of the system. 
Now, add the election administration regime to the mix. 
Something as simple as the election calendar can determine the 
amount of money a candidate may need to raise—more for a 
nine-month general campaign and less for a two-month gen-
eral campaign. Early voting and voting by mail, on the other 
hand, can shorten the election calendar by weeks at its most 
critical stage, shifting a party’s get-out-the-vote efforts while 
potentially mooting some campaign finance disclosure dead-
lines that fall after the most informed voters have cast their bal-
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lots. Whether state or local elections are on or off the presiden-
tial cycle may determine how large or small the primary elec-
torate is for top-tier offices and how much the general elec-
torate will discipline potentially polarized primary choices. 
Add redistricting, and the system changes again. In states with 
legislative control of redistricting, a post-census election exerts 
a powerful draw for outside money as national parties seek to 
line up favorable districts for Congressional seats, which may 
impose new disciplining forces on party candidates at cam-
paigns. The same may be true for top election officials like Sec-
retaries of State in swing states. Add public integrity laws, and 
the efficacy of such outside influence might increase or de-
crease depending on lobbying regulations or open meeting 
laws. And so on. 
C. The Persistence of State Political Cultures 
States continue to exhibit distinct identities, manifest in their 
political cultures and linked to the institutional structure of a 
state rather than regional or local factors.212 A state’s political cul-
ture is a function of these rules, regimes, and systems, interact-
ing with non-legal realities like demographics, economics, and 
geography. State political culture is the inertia that slows one-
size-fits-all reform efforts. It is the reason why changing any one 
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rule, no matter how radical or enlightened, barely moves the 
needle in transforming a state’s republicanism. Across the board, 
a national rule, regime, or system of election law might nudge 
each state republicanism a little more toward participation, 
competition, equality, or representation on its own scale. But po-
litical culture ensures that no reform will make State A as partic-
ipatory, equal, competitive, or representative as State B. Com-
parisons of money in politics, state voting turnout, electoral 
contestation, and policy alignment demonstrate the dominance 
of political culture in state republicanisms. 
1. Participation and Voting Turnout 
The average turnout from the voting-eligible population re-
cently hovers around 57% in recent presidential elections and 
39% in midterm elections, though this conceals a 30-point range 
among the states.213 A voter would be about 50% more likely to 
cast a vote come November in chilly Minnesota or Maine than in 
warmer Hawaii or Texas.214 Distinctions persist among neigh-
boring states; Ohioans turn out more than ten percentage points 
more than West Virginians, and Coloradans turn out an average 
of fourteen percentage points more than Arizonans.215 In 2012, 
black voters generally voted at higher rates than white voters in 
the eastern third of the United States, particularly in the Mid-
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Atlantic and East South Central states, and at lower rates than 
white voters in the western third, particularly in the Mountain 
West.216 Non-Hispanic White voters generally voted at substan-
tially higher rates than Hispanic voters, but the discrepancy was 
at least twenty percentage points in Central states, but less than 
ten points along most of the East Coast.217 Remarkably, the varia-
tion in voter turnout among states today may be greater than the 
historical variation in national voter turnout (among the increas-
ing voting-eligible population) throughout the entire twentieth 
century.218 This interstate variation overwhelms any impact on 
turnout of voter ID, early voting, same-day registration, or any 
other single voting rule. 
A second degree of variation arises beyond the biennial 
Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Participation in 
primary elections varies by a factor of two. Even in the 2008 
presidential campaign for an open seat, and setting aside New 
Hampshire’s 54% primary turnout, participation ranged from 
40% or more (Oregon, Ohio, Vermont, and California) to 20% 
or less (Michigan, New York, Louisiana, and Republican pri-
maries in New Mexico and Idaho), nearing the 16% participa-
tion rate for Iowa’s presidential caucuses.219 This analysis con-
siders only state and federal general elections. In local 
elections, turnout averages as low as 26% for city mayoral rac-
es, with turnout as much as 15 to 27 points lower for elections 
that do not coincide with midterm and presidential elections, 
respectively, than for elections that do coincide with federal 
elections.220 In many urban centers, few voting rights remedies 
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would have as powerful an effect as simply moving local elec-
tions to coincide with state and federal elections. 
2. Equality and Campaign Finance 
Beyond the core of basic political equality in voting rights, the 
most contested arena of equality values in election law is cam-
paign finance, and in particular the relative influence of wealthy 
donors on campaigns. For better or for worse, the amount of 
money in at-large state campaigns is comparable to federal Senate 
campaigns, despite the massive infusions of national campaign 
funding into Senate campaigns, particularly in “cheap seats” from 
smaller states. One study of Senate campaigns from 2010 to 2014 
found the median candidate and independent spending per race 
to be $7 per capita, but among the most competitive races the 
spending varied widely from Alaska’s $121 per voter in 2014 and 
Montana’s $67 per voter in 2012 to around $15 to $17 per voter in 
North Carolina (2014), Virginia (2012), Massachusetts (2012), and 
Colorado (2010).221 These bear a striking resemblance to the vary-
ing cost of campaigns by state found by Louise Overacker’s pio-
neering study of campaign finance. In the 1928 presidential cam-
paign, “[t]he cost of Democratic votes ranged from $4.46 in 
Nevada [about $60 in 2012 dollars] to nothing at all in Maine and 
Vermont, while the Republicans spent $1.75 per voter in Arizona 
[about $24 in 2012 dollars] and $0.03 per voter in Maine [about 
$0.40 in 2012 dollars].”222 The median amount spent in states by 
each presidential campaign was about $0.50 per voter in 1928 
(about $6.70 in 2012 dollars).223 
Comparable campaign finance figures for state races are 
more difficult to determine. In 2014 state campaigns with gov-
ernors’ races, estimated per voter television campaign adver-
tisement spending alone ranged from $10 or more (in Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, and Illinois) to $2 or less (in Vermont, 
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South Dakota, California, Tennessee, and Oregon).224 The mix 
of campaign spending changes dramatically from state to state. 
The dominant funding sources for television campaigns in-
cluded 68% independent expenditures in Kansas, 72% party 
funds in Florida, and 100% candidate campaign expenditures 
in Vermont and South Dakota (and 99% in Texas).225 Widening 
the scope to all candidate fundraising, but still excluding inde-
pendent expenditures, a recent study found aggregate contri-
butions per voter of between $0.81 and $17.75 over the period 
of 2003 through 2010.226 
A synthesis of both participation and equality values, partici-
pation in campaign finance varies by an order of magnitude 
from state to state. In the most recent gubernatorial election 
years on record, the top five states (Vermont in 2010, Rhode Is-
land in 2010, Montana in 2012, Hawaii in 2010, and Massachu-
setts in 2010) boasted per capita campaign contribution rates of 
between 3.5% and 5.9% of voting age population, while the bot-
tom five states (Florida in 2010, California in 2010, Utah in 2012 
and 2010, New York in 2010, and Nevada in 2010) lagged with 
participation rates of just 0.2% to 0.6%.227 The donor mix varies 
widely too. Large contributions (over $1000 and PACs) account 
for more than 80% of candidate fundraising in Georgia, Mis-
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souri, Utah, Texas, and Nevada.228 Small contributions ($250 or 
less) account for the majority of funding in Connecticut and 
Minnesota, and more than 40% of funding in Wisconsin, Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island, Maine, Arizona, and Montana.229 
3. Competition and Contested Races 
Electoral competition is an elusive thing to measure, and 
may be even harder to promote. Looking to campaign finance 
data, and excluding the three “clean elections” states with full 
public funding (Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine), the top five 
most competitive states in 2011 and 2012 state legislative races 
(New Hampshire, Minnesota, Alaska, South Dakota, and North 
Dakota) had runners-up who raised at least half of the winning 
candidate in one-third to two-thirds of the seats.230 The eight 
least competitive states (Georgia, Texas, Florida, Wyoming, 
South Carolina, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Missouri) had 
ten percent or fewer seats that rated competitive by that meas-
ure.231 Other indices comparing open seats, primary contests, 
and major party competition in state legislative races find simi-
lar variations in incumbency turnover,232 open seats,233 contest-
ed primaries,234 and major-party contested general elections. 235 
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4. Representation and Policy Alignment 
Another basic but elusive value is representation in terms of 
alignment between elected officials and constituents. At first 
glance, alignment appears to be an unimpeachable republican 
value, since republicanism is in, Madison’s terms, simply “a 
government in which the scheme of representation takes 
place.”236 But as with all republican values there are tradeoffs, 
and even for Madison, simple alignment in terms of majority 
rule is suspect. Any political community might reasonably 
prefer to weigh other values more heavily, such as broad-
based and sustained participation in politics, equal opportuni-
ty for influence, or competition that fosters debate and re-
finement of policies. Representation itself takes different 
forms, depending on whether the relevant representation oc-
curs at the level of the elected official, the representative 
body, or enacted policy. A state that places representation 
above all other values may have difficulty knowing how well 
it is achieving it. 
Fortunately, political science has taken major strides in 
measuring and analyzing representation in terms of alignment 
at the state level. Consistent with distinct and persistent repub-
lican pluralism in the States, Stephanopoulos, McGhee, and 
Rogers find “both alignment and responsiveness vary marked-
ly from state to state, but not very much from year to year,” 
over a period of more than two decades.237 Legislatures in Del-
aware, Georgia, Idaho, and Tennessee align well with their 
electorates, while California and Connecticut lean to the left 
and those in Ohio and Michigan lean to the right.238 Of those 
state legislatures, however, Michigan and Tennessee are highly 
responsive to changes in the state electorate’s preferences, Del-
aware is moderately responsive; California, Idaho, and Ohio 
are nonresponsive; and Georgia appears to move against shifts 
in its electorate despite its good alignment.239 Another study of 
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alignment of policy outcomes with state public opinion found 
the highest congruence in California and Louisiana (69%) and 
the lowest in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
and Wyoming (33%).240 
IV. THE FEDERALIST SAFEGUARDS OF POLITICS 
If the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of the fed-
eral government are unlikely to make further significant pro-
gress in guaranteeing a republican form of government—
however conceived—they should step aside and encourage the 
States to step in. National political gridlock, even if only transi-
tional, presents an opportunity for each state to refine republi-
canism in response to the changing landscape of politics as 
each state experiences it.241 More than this, it presents an oppor-
tunity for states to play a role in breaking the national political 
gridlock. American federalism has been described as a series of 
popular movements entrusting the federal or state govern-
ments with more or less confidence as the times demand,242 and 
Americans now have historically low levels of confidence in 
the federal government.243 The means of devolution are clear 
enough in the federal and state constitutions, though are ad-
mittedly less clear in politics.244 The end itself is an opportunity 
to reconceive state republicanism and perhaps to recompose 
national republicanism in the diverse image of the state repub-
lics that compose the Union. 
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Whatever one’s view of the current national political dys-
function, it is difficult to deny states a role in either the prob-
lem or the solution. Jack Balkin recently listed a dozen causes 
of intransigence and gridlock in the current national political 
system.245 One-third of the dozen are predominantly policies 
that Congress and the Supreme Court have largely left to the 
States (primaries, first-past-the-post elections, political gerry-
mandering, and state laws that discourage the exercise of vot-
ing rights by poor and minority voters). Another third were 
originally state policies that Congress has preempted in whole 
or part, or federal policies the Supreme Court invalidated in 
whole or part (single-member districts, campaign finance law, 
First Amendment restrictions on campaign finance reform 
and primaries, and the dismantling of preclearance under the 
Voting Rights Act by Shelby County v. Holder).246 Other ana-
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lysts reach similar diagnoses based on similar symptoms, 
most of which occur at the state level.247 A republican perfec-
tionist, taking a national perspective, might view the first set 
of problems as failures of the federal government to act and 
the second set of problems as federal mistakes to be corrected 
by a future federal regime. A republican pluralist, taking a 
state perspective, might see both sets of problems as opportu-
nities for state innovation even where (as in the second set) 
contested republican perfectionism at the national level has 
limited the possibilities for reform. 
In either case, as long as the federal government is unable to 
break the gridlock, the States are where the action is. Even if “the 
federal government—especially its courts—plays a more signifi-
cant role today,” which Tokaji and Wolfe endorse, “election ad-
ministration is still mostly a matter of state law and local prac-
tice.” 248  State laws also structure parties and representation 
through primaries and redistricting, with significant conse-
quences for national politics, and there is no immediate prospect 
of changing that.249 Although these spheres of state political au-
tonomy are coming under increasing pressure from national ex-
penditures in state campaigns—in part to gain national political 
control over the crucial state levers of election administration 
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and redistricting—state law still sets the ground rules. Most 
campaign finance runs through the States. Nearly all election 
administration policy comes from the States. Nearly all elected 
offices, constituencies, and representative bodies are in the 
States. Nearly all redistricting and party regulation occurs at the 
state level. In most of these policy areas, there is greater diversity 
among election laws in the States today than has existed across 
changes at the federal level over the past century. 
State politics demonstrate the same diversity relative to na-
tional politics for many practices, including participation in 
turnout terms, competitiveness in contestation terms, and 
equality in campaign finance terms. As the Supreme Court rec-
ognized in assessing the line between state and federal qualifi-
cations for state officials in Gregory v. Ashcroft,250 the realm of 
republicanism itself is an important place for federalism to play 
out. “It assures a decentralized government that will be more 
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it in-
creases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic pro-
cesses; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in 
government; and it makes government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”251 
States have been, and will continue to be, laboratories of de-
mocracy in the term’s most literal sense.252 
                                                                                                        
 250. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 251. Id. at 458. 
 252. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). Beyond the basic inherent value of states’ autonomy in developing 
their republican forms of government, William Marshall provides five reasons 
state campaign finance laws might be superior to federal campaign finance laws: 
(1) mitigating entrenchment, (2) ameliorating unintended consequences, (3) inte-
grating other election laws, (4) increasing citizen participation, and (5) facilitating 
policy experimentation. See William Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign 
Finance Regulation: Should Differences in a State’s Political History and Culture Mat-
ter?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 79, 91–92 (2013). Each of these might be extended beyond 
campaign finance to election administration, districting and representation, and 
party regulation. These reasons are variations on the standard arguments for de-
centralization under federalism, a classic statement of which is Michael 
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 
1493 (1987) (“Three important advantages of decentralized decision making 
emerge from an examination of the founders’ arguments and the modern litera-
ture. First, decentralized decision making is better able to reflect the diversity of 
interests and preferences of individuals in different parts of the nation. Second, 
allocation of decision making authority to a level of government no larger than 
 
No. 2] Federalist Safeguards of Politics 471 
States are especially suited to experiment in the area of de-
mocracy itself. For all the work political theory does in election 
law doctrine, a lot of election law is contested on empirical 
grounds or otherwise turns on the effect a particular republican 
regime has on the public. Bruce Cain notes: “the thresholds for 
change at the state and local level are less, and that is where 
institutional experimentation should occur.”253 For example, as 
Richard Hasen argues, the regulation of false campaign speech 
may call for narrower laws or new institutions to facilitate 
counterspeech;254 yet the efficacy of such solutions cannot be 
known without some experimentation and evaluation at the 
state level. When states enjoy greater freedom to diversify their 
regimes, they may help resolve intramural debates and per-
haps unify reform agendas. Which primary systems minimize 
polarization? Which districting standards maximize minority 
policymaking power? Which campaign finance systems mini-
mize the appearance of corruption? Which election reforms 
maximize voter turnout? Some or all of these questions may 
have a right national answer at some point, but nationalization 
of the issue by Congress or the Supreme Court may not be the 
best way to get there.255 While proposed Congressional reforms 
gather dust, some 32 states enacted 94 bills on campaign fi-
nance issues alone in 2015.256 
In 2000, William Marshall warned of the high stakes involved 
in the continued nationalization of election law, with a focus on 
campaign finance. “[W]hen the barriers to success are so high, 
and the risks of miscalculation so great,” he argued, “the regula-
tory reform of first resort should be the states and not the federal 
                                                                                                        
necessary will prevent mutually disadvantageous attempts by communities to 
take advantage of their neighbors. And third, decentralization allows for innova-
tion and competition in government.”). 
 253. CAIN, supra note 51, at 214. 
 254. Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 
74 MONT. L. REV. 53 (2013). 
 255. See, e.g., HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION 
SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009) (proposing rankings of state and 
local election administration to facilitate experimentation and accountability 
through democratic processes). 
 256. Campaign Finance Legislation Database: 2015 Onward, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (July 2, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/campaign-finance-database-2015-onward.aspx [http://perma.cc/AQZ2-
6JG4]. 
472 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 39 
government.”257 Similarly, Hasen warns against broad constitu-
tional changes to remedy what may be a transitional period of 
dysfunction. 258  After sweeping campaign finance reforms of 
BCRA led to Citizens United and Super PACs, after the principle 
of meticulous electoral equality in Bush v. Gore led to very lit-
tle,259 and after the current presidential administration’s reener-
gized voting rights enforcement was followed by the hobbling of 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act,260 caution may call for a lower-
stakes approach rather than another risky one-size-fits-all solu-
tion. More than a decade ago, Heather Gerken diagnosed what 
she called a “doctrinal interregnum,” and suggested the im-
portance of the courts enabling other institutional actors into “a 
more dynamic process for resolving these problems than the 
command-and-control strategy deployed by the courts thus 
far.”261 Bold federal efforts by Congress, the President, and the 
Supreme Court, often in incoherent combination, have both ex-
acerbated the flaws of our national republicanism and en-
trenched them in a three-branch stalemate. It is as urgent as ever 
that election law somehow find a way to move on. 
A. State Means 
Recall the national Constitution leaves ample space for the 
development of republican pluralism consistent with estab-
lished standards of basic political equality. Nothing prevents 
states from structuring their own elections,262 so long as they do 
not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race,263 
sex,264 taxes,265 or age (if eighteen or older),266 or violate appro-
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priate legislation enforcing these and other rights.267 Except for 
its guarantee of a “Republican Form of Government,”268 the 
original Constitution says little about state elections beyond 
repeated implications that the States will have legislatures and 
some form of executive and judicial officers.269 As to federal 
elections, the Constitution provides states the power to pre-
scribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives,”270 subject to alteration by Con-
gress. States also have the power to direct the manner, though 
not the time, of appointment for presidential electors.271 
Under this constitutional structure it has taken multiple af-
firmative decisions by Congress, the Supreme Court, or both, to 
nationalize state politics to its current extent. These decisions are 
most clear in the preemption of “any provision of State law with 
respect to election to Federal office” in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act.272 Notably, in an era of increasingly strict con-
structions of Congress’s powers, this arguably exceeds the origi-
nal understanding of the Elections Clause, which was ratified 
only in light of serious entrenchment concerns that militate 
against Congress writing its own campaign finance rules.273 This 
same trend narrowed federal power under the Voting Rights Act 
over voting rights and related redistricting and election admin-
istration.274 So it is possible that any move by Congress to de-
volve republicanism might also involve a nudge by the Supreme 
Court. But the Court itself also remains an important obstacle to 
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devolution, particularly given its increased scrutiny of state elec-
tion law relative even to federal election law,275 especially when 
such scrutiny is unjustified and may be counterproductive.276 
States retain some room to maneuver despite the Court’s in-
coherent approach to republicanism. Even in the area of cam-
paign finance, several Justices have indicated a recognition of 
the drawbacks of nationalizing state politics, and at times when 
writing on their own, they have expressed a willingness to al-
low the States more latitude in determining their republican 
forms of government. Dissenting in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission,277 Justice Scalia criticized the majority for “set[ting] 
their own views—on a practical matter that bears closely upon 
the real-life experience of elected politicians and not upon that 
of unelected judges—up against the views of 49 (and perhaps 
all 50 . . . ) state legislatures and the Federal Congress.”278 Con-
curring in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,279 Justice 
Breyer explained, “Where a legislature has significantly greater 
institutional expertise, as, for example, in the field of election 
regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative 
judgments—at least where that deference does not risk such 
constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate 
themselves from effective electoral challenge.”280 Dissenting in 
Nixon, Justice Kennedy said he would prefer to “free Congress 
or state legislatures to attempt some new reform, if, based up-
on their own considered view of the First Amendment, it is 
possible to do so.”281 He might have added as a factor the 
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State’s own considered view of another crucial constitutional 
provision: the republican form of government. 
Of equal importance, state constitutions provide ample 
means of regulating both state and federal elections that are 
superior to Congress’s own powers. Many state constitutions 
guarantee an express right to vote, and some provide “free and 
open” elections.282 Several common state constitutional features 
increase accountability and reduce the risk of entrenchment. 
Twenty-seven states have some form of statutory initiative or 
referendum by citizen petition.283 Initiatives, or threats of initia-
tives, play at least a modest role in electoral reforms, particular-
ly those opposed by incumbent officials.284 While it is a double-
edged sword of accountability and anti-entrenchment, most 
states hold elections for judges on their courts of last resort.285 
This increased legislative responsiveness to each state’s citizens 
facilitates diverse state constitutional and statutory election re-
gimes driven by each state’s “political traditions, structures, 
and exigencies,”286 and is therefore likely to be more effective 
than nationalization at perfecting any particular conception of 
republicanism. More broadly, such an innovative reform as the 
“separation of electoral powers” Edward Foley has proposed,287 
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is inconceivable at any but the state level, where novel alloca-
tions of judicial, legislative, and executive powers are possible 
under flexible state constitutions. 
While these features of state politics compare favorably to the 
federal status quo, it is possible to overstate their relative bene-
fits. Although in theory it is more difficult for any particular fac-
tion to coordinate entrenchment in fifty state legislatures than in 
one Congress, state-oriented national campaign and lobbying 
groups may exploit the relatively low cost of election or access to 
state legislatures where its national principals might achieve rel-
atively high policy payoffs from coordinated state action.288 The 
question is whether federal or state efforts are more likely to 
counter these nationalizing trends. Effective regulations for such 
campaign and lobbying groups may be more likely to come 
from locally responsive and institutionally diverse state offices 
than from the FEC, IRS, or other federal agencies with at best 
indirect jurisdiction over (and indirect interest in) such groups. 
Even if, despite the States’ structural defenses, entrenchment in 
the States were more of a problem than entrenchment in Con-
gress, this does not argue for continued nationalization. It is a fal-
lacy of composition to conclude that the effect of increased state 
entrenchment on federal elections is necessarily increased en-
trenchment in federal offices.289 For example, any one state legisla-
ture may well manipulate campaign finance, the primary process, 
voter identification requirements, or the Electoral College. Several 
analysts find “[p]artisan manipulation of election laws in an effort 
to help one’s own party win” may be on the rise.290 But across all 
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fifty states, entrenchment effects can offset each other as the mix-
ture of different election law regimes produces a more diverse 
Congress and Presidential Electors that could not be attributable 
(as it may be now) to a single entrenched federal regime. 
Madison, of course, foresaw how national republicanism 
properly conceived still may allow “[t]he influence of factious 
leaders [to] kindle a flame within their particular States.”291 But 
so long as states remain under the broad shield of the republi-
can guarantee, they “will be unable to spread a general confla-
gration through the other States.”292 The same diversity of poli-
cies at the state level also ameliorates unintended consequences 
by internalizing most of the costs of a dysfunctional policy and 
limiting the rest of the costs to the impact of one state among 
fifty. Such risks of factious or partisan conflagration have been 
reduced over time with the additional federal constitutional 
guarantees of basic political equality, and the various state con-
stitutional innovations to circumvent self-interested officials 
discussed above. 
In the worst-case scenario, a state’s entrenched regime is still 
more likely than an entrenched federal regime to align with its 
citizens’ distinct republican values. A state’s citizens bear re-
sponsibility for the quality of their republican form of govern-
ment, which, by definition, is a government its citizens can con-
trol. States may not only better internalize their policies, but 
also better integrate their policies. National policies, on the oth-
er hand, can blunder on their merits as well as in their interac-
tion with state policies. As William Marshall argues: 
Allowing states to adjust their campaign finance rules to re-
flect such [local] realities would both assist the states in en-
acting legislation that corresponds to their other laws gov-
erning elections and perhaps encourage the states to more 
thoroughly analyze proposed election laws through the lens 
of its effects on campaign funding issues.293 
Both of these interests hold as true for an overly strict or lib-
eral campaign finance regime as they do for election admin-
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istration, redistricting, and primary systems, as well as for 
their potential interactions. 
Finally, any proposal that urges the Supreme Court or Con-
gress to “correct” or perfect state republicanism must account 
for the endogeneity of those institutions to the political system 
the states help structure. As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
explain, “[j]udges are inside the political system, not outside 
it,”294 and any dominant party in Congress that enjoys the polit-
ical unity to advance major changes to the political process 
“will have the least interest in enacting them.”295 It is not clear 
that a deeply divided Supreme Court or Congress that is, in 
part, a product of deeply divided federal political processes (as 
well as earlier federal judicial and legislative regulation and 
deregulation of political processes) will be any better posi-
tioned to rise above entrenched dysfunction than the States. In 
countering such dysfunction, it may be more effective to rec-
ognize and work through the States’ central role in any process 
of reforming national republicanism. 
B. Republican Ends 
Devolution of the reform of republicanism to the States 
might result in deep structural reforms to campaigns and elec-
tions, perpetuation of the status quo, or deregulation. Whatev-
er the result, it is more likely to be internally coherent within 
each state, flexible, and reflective of citizens’ specific concep-
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tions of a republican form of government than the current 
patchwork of uneven judicial doctrine, regulation, and en-
forcement accumulated through attempts to nationalize state 
politics. Each state has its own political culture, reflected in the 
distinctions discussed above. As William Marshall puts it, 
“[S]ome of the differences in political culture between the 
states may express very different views of democratic theo-
ry . . . . [I]ndeed, each state appears to express its own theory of 
democracy.”296 In addition to holding distinct values, the States 
also generate vastly different political dynamics driven by 
things like media markets and the size of legislative districts.297 
Bruce Cain observes in arguing for a “metapluralist” approach 
to reform pluralism that “[c]onsistency of any one approach is 
not possible.”298 It takes different means, and perhaps different 
ends, to govern different political systems. 
Beyond each state’s republicanism, however, republican plu-
ralism among the States also may be the last best chance for 
reforming national republicanism. Some reformers favor devo-
lution to the states for its own sake. For them, the best ap-
proach would extend republican pluralism closer to the outer 
limits of the republican guarantee consistent with weak en-
forcement of basic political equality. These pure pluralists 
would roll back relatively modest federal efforts to fund and 
regulate state and local election administration. They might 
celebrate the hobbling of the Voting Rights Act and limit its 
remaining enforcement to “first generation” barriers to voting 
itself, supplemented by Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment 
prohibitions on discrimination. They would step back from na-
tional debates over Congressional gerrymandering and per-
haps even repeal the federal single-member restriction on Con-
gressional districts. 299  They would oppose further judicial 
regulation of state primary processes. And they would be as 
critical of the current Supreme Court’s campaign finance doc-
trine as they are supportive of its voting rights decisions, 
though they would cheer challenges to BCRA’s regulation of 
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state parties.300 Perhaps, they hope, Congress will repeal or the 
Supreme Court will invalidate federal preemption of state 
campaign finance regulation of federal campaigns.301 The States 
would take it from there. 
Other reformers should consider embracing republican plu-
ralism to achieve non-pluralist ends, however. Republican plu-
ralism is a fact, and contested republican values like accounta-
bility and participation, majority rule and minority 
representation, deliberation and responsiveness, equality and 
liberty of influence, legitimacy and self-expression, competition 
and stability may conflict inherently or in implementation. But 
even perfectionist reformers who believe in any one of these 
values may find more success in realizing it nationally by de-
veloping it in the States. They should embrace pluralism as a 
source of innovation, and make a virtue out of the necessary 
premise that states vary widely in their republican forms of 
government. Reform of the national government is impossible 
without working through the States, even for one-size-fits-all 
solutions. There is no way past national political dysfunction 
but through it, and cultivating pluralism in the states may pro-
vide a more effective means toward national perfectionist ends. 
1. Competition 
Some of the most important factors of political competition 
are already controlled by the States. The States can be particu-
larly effective agents of anti-entrenchment for federal officials 
because state, rather than federal, officials make the rules. 
Across the range of election laws, it is more difficult to capture 
fifty state legislatures than it is to capture Congress. In election 
administration, this difference has made further progress on 
uniform registration, early voting, and voter identification dif-
ficult beyond reforms of the past two decades, but it also has 
prevented uniform retrenchment on these fronts. Election ad-
ministration may be excessively partisan toward one party in 
some states, but at least it is not uniformly partisan toward a 
single party across all states. 
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Similarly, despite the high national political stakes, many 
states have begun to innovate politically independent redis-
tricting processes; there is no guarantee that a national nudge 
toward redistricting reform from an already deeply gerryman-
dered Congress would be in the direction of reform rather than 
retrenchment. States’ roles in party regulation, particularly 
through the primary system, also have more potential to coun-
teract polarization by reflecting and preserving distinct state 
party values. Finally, states also might fix the federal campaign 
finance system, for their own Congressional delegations and in 
their own ways, if Congress would only let them. 
2. Equality 
Equality often involves a clear tradeoff with other values, such 
as liberty. This is all the more reason to leave the expression of 
such values primarily to the States. Assuming a national reformer 
wished to increase political equality beyond the basic political 
equality established by the Constitution, particularly in terms of 
preventing corruption and equalizing the access and influence 
enjoyed mainly by wealthy interest groups over Congress (as well 
as state officials), states provide a novel approach to a fraught is-
sue. With minor exceptions,302 federal campaign finance law sets 
one-size-fits-all rules regardless of a candidate’s constituency. 
Federal individual contribution limits for 2016 are $2,700 to feder-
al candidates, and federal contribution disclosure is triggered at 
$200, regardless of whether that candidate’s constituency is the 
United States or Wyoming’s one at-large congressional district 
(which is more than 500 times smaller in population).303 Federal 
regulation of coordination and electioneering expenditures is 
complex to the point of inefficacy and is underenforced. 
If campaign finance regulation of federal candidates were re-
turned to the States, these thresholds could reflect each state’s 
balance of anti-corruption and (within the bounds established by 
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the anti-corruption interest) equality interests.304 States may in-
crease the candidate contribution limits to check the influence of 
Super PACs funded by the super-wealthy (even at the expense 
of increasing contributions by the moderately wealthy), or re-
duce disclosure requirements to invite larger anonymous contri-
butions by publicity-shy donors who might otherwise give nom-
inal amounts. Other states may reduce the contribution 
maximums and disclosure thresholds, reflecting lesser campaign 
costs or greater concerns about corruption. A few states might 
extend public financing to Congressional elections. Some states 
may deregulate campaign finance for their federal elections al-
together. And any state might enforce its laws more effectively 
than the FEC currently enforces federal law. 
3. Representation 
Multiple state rules bear on the quality of representation 
federal elections can provide, at least in terms of federal offi-
cials’ policy alignment with their state-based constituencies. A 
state’s redistricting process will shape a federal candidate’s 
electorate directly. The state election calendar and party regu-
lation, interacting in the primary process, also will impact 
whether a candidate is elected with a broader or narrower 
base of support. State-specific campaign finance rules may 
determine whether a candidate can rely on larger individual 
or political committee contributions within the district to fund 
most of a campaign, or must depend on support from national 
Super PACs or activist out-of-state donors. 
The remarkable variation in representational alignment 
among states raises basic questions about how reformers might 
improve representation at the state and federal levels, given the 
array of electoral rules, regimes, and systems states control. 
Stephanopoulos, McGhee, and Rogers cite sore loser laws, early 
voting, contribution limits, and independent redistricting com-
missions as increasing alignment, and public financing, term 
limits, and open primaries as possibly reducing alignment.305 
Within any one state seeking to maximize alignment, nearly all 
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of these reforms could apply to federal elections, except for term 
limits (which may compromise alignment) and campaign fi-
nance reforms (unless federal preemption is repealed). 
4. Participation 
Participation provides one of the clearest opportunities for 
progress in the States, given the wide range of voter turnout 
and campaign finance participation. National reforms to voter 
registration have fallen short, and other national reforms like 
BCRA’s regulation of state party get-out-the-vote efforts run 
counter to efforts at increasing participation. State turnout is a 
complicated function of each state’s political culture and legal 
system, which itself arises from interactions among election 
administration, districting, party regulation, and campaign fi-
nance regimes. Within a state’s election administration regime, 
different tradeoffs between early voting and polling hours, or 
voter ID requirements and mail voting opportunities, could 
produce distinct participation outcomes depending on interac-
tions with other rules and regimes, as well as demographics 
and geography. Early and mail voting may increase turnout in 
some states but enable procrastination in others that would 
benefit more from more convenient polling places or hours. 
States that already provide ample voting opportunities might 
concentrate instead on increasing political competition through 
redistricting or campaign finance. The mix will be different for 
each state and will always be constrained by limited resources. 
But the logic of republican pluralism suggests that any fixed set 
of financial and political resources dedicated to increasing par-
ticipation (or pursuing other values) will result in a greater 
payoff when working within a state’s distinct republicanism. 
Full participation includes citizen participation in forming 
and reforming the rules that govern their republic.306 This may 
be especially important for campaign finance given the ex-
tremely narrow section of Americans that donate.307 Increased 
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participation itself helps perfect the republican form of gov-
ernment, of which Madison deemed essential “that it be de-
rived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsid-
erable proportion, or a favored class of it.”308 Spencer Overton, 
articulating a modern variation of what he calls “the Participa-
tion Interest,” explains that “[p]articipation exposes the elec-
torate to a variety of ideas and viewpoints, furthers self-
government, and enhances the legitimacy of government deci-
sions.”309 Moreover, citizens’ increased participation in struc-
turing politics at the state level can and should influence the 
structure of politics at the federal level. As Franita Tolson ex-
plains, “[F]ederal officials have to answer to dual constituen-
cies; the idea that the state is not one of these interest groups is 
a legal fiction, and sometimes the ‘people’ speak best through 
their state legislatures.”310 If states could amplify citizens’ voic-
es in setting the federal political agenda through how they send 
their representatives to Washington, rather than simply whom 
they send, that would itself be a worthy end. 
CONCLUSION 
States are as much republics, and at least as competent at re-
publicanism, as is the Union in its current state. A court wres-
tling with the post-Citizens United era recently held: “It is fun-
damental to the definition of our national political community 
that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to partici-
pate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities of democratic 
self-government.”311 This suggests an equally fundamental but 
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more modest corollary for our state republics: any state’s citizens 
have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus should be 
included in, its own activities of democratic self-government. 
Foremost among those activities is asking what democratic self-
government, or republicanism, means. The answer to that ques-
tion is not likely to come from the federal government anytime 
soon. It may be worth asking the States. 
